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ABSTRACT 
 This Article provides an empirical analysis of Iowa Supreme Court 
decisions from 2004–2013 that employ legislative history in interpreting Iowa 
statutes. It answers the question: When the Iowa Supreme Court consults 
legislative history in construing an Iowa statute, what specific types of 
materials are cited? Further, this Article provides an overview of statutory 
drafting and construction in Iowa and discusses the inherent uncertainties of 
statutory interpretation, using Sallee v. Stewart and State v. Heemstra to 
illustrate the variance in how the court decides whether historical analysis 
applies to a case and, if so, what it means. Although a precise formula for 
“correctly” reading a statute cannot be formulated, this Article suggests some 
practices that will help ensure as thorough a reading of an Iowa statute as 
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possible. This Article concludes with two recommendations for the Iowa 
Supreme Court. First, consistently cite Iowa Code Section 4.6(3) when using 
legislative history to determine legislative intent. Second, formulate a more 
complex rule on the use of bill explanations in determining legislative intent, 
neither abandoning them completely nor always using them, but instead 
considering them as an extrinsic source of evidence for understanding a statute 
only when appropriate after analyzing the bill’s amendment history. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Documented legislative history in Iowa has been described as 
nonexistent.1 While this is an overstatement,2 the Iowa Supreme Court has 
noted, and scholars have lamented, the scarcity of useful Iowa legislative 
history records.3 
Yet the Iowa Supreme Court can,4 and sometimes does,5 turn to 
legislative history in statutory construction. So, what is the court reading? 
Although some authors describe available sources of Iowa legislative 
history—and might even include a few examples6—and others consider the 
development of a single statute,7 research revealed only one prior-published 
 
 1.  See EDWARD N. MCCONNELL, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY RECORDS 1 (1999) 
(noting that as a law student, professors told him “there was no state legislative history 
in Iowa,” and any records that do exist are not as important as federal legislative history). 
 2.  See id. at 2–5 (explaining some of the Iowa legislative history records to which 
a researcher has access). 
 3.  See, e.g., Oyens Feed & Supply, Inc. v. Primebank, 808 N.W.2d 186, 188 (Iowa 
2011) (citing a bill explanation and then noting that “[o]ther legislative history is 
sparse”); State v. Comried, 693 N.W.2d 773, 776 (Iowa 2005) (noting a statutory 
amendment possessed “no direct legislative history”); Wade S. Hauser, Note, Does 
Iowa’s Health Care External Review Process Replace Common-Law Rights?, 99 IOWA L. 
REV. 1401, 1414 (2014) (“As is often the case in Iowa, there is little legislative history to 
illuminate” the statute under consideration in the article (footnote omitted)); Benjamin 
M. Parrott, Note, For Better or for Worse? The Iowa Supreme Court’s Decision to 
Compensate the Innocent Coinsured Spouse in Sager v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Company, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 561, 582–83 (2006) (observing that “there appears to be 
no Iowa legislative history explaining the purpose of” the relevant code section, making 
it difficult to determine legislative intent). 
 4.  IOWA CODE § 4.6(3) (2013). 
 5.  See, e.g., State v. Allen, 708 N.W.2d 361, 366–68 (Iowa 2006); Builder’s Land 
Co. v. Martens, 122 N.W.2d 189, 191 (Iowa 1963) (“We may resort to legislative journals 
for the legislative history of a statute of doubtful meaning.”). 
 6.  E.g., JOHN D. EDWARDS ET AL., IOWA LEGAL RESEARCH 163–90 (2011). 
 7.  See, e.g., Martin D. Begleiter, Son of the Trust Code—The Iowa Trust Code After 
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empirical analysis of the sources actually consulted by the Iowa Supreme 
Court.8 Tellingly titled The Inadequacy of Legislative Recordings in Iowa, a 
1949 Note reviewed a 12-year span of cases published in the Iowa Reports 
to identify 129 that involved statutory interpretation.9 In 23 of these 
opinions, the court examined legislative history, once using “a special 
committee report and an executive message to determine legislative 
intent.”10 In the other 22 cases, 
[T]he legislative history of the bill was reviewed . . . either to check upon 
the constitutional validity of the legislative proceedings or to determine 
the record of amendments proposed and rejected. By this latter process 
the court drew an inference from the inaction of the legislature as to its 
intention.11 
The current study provides an empirical analysis of Iowa Supreme 
Court decisions from 2004–2013 that employ legislative history in 
interpreting Iowa statutes. The study’s principal goal is to answer the 
question: When the Iowa Supreme Court consults legislative history in 
construing an Iowa statute, what specific types of materials are cited? The 
question is of obvious interest to the Iowa practitioner. When confronting 
an ambiguous statute for which the Iowa Supreme Court may turn to 
legislative history as part of its analysis, attorneys who are aware of the 
sources the court has considered in the past will be alerted to their 
importance. 
Of course, knowing what to read12 is only the first step. The question 
of how the court will apply these sources naturally follows. Here, the study 
 
Ten Years, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 265 (2011); Roger D. Colton, The Use of Canons of 
Statutory Construction: A Case Study from Iowa or When Does “Ghoti” Spell “Fish”?, 5 
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 149 (1982). 
 8.  A related analysis of statutory interpretation in Iowa looked at an undisclosed 
number of cases “with the purpose of observing the consistency or lack of it in this job 
of statutory interpretation.” Richard S. Hudson, When a Vending Machine is Not a 
Vending Machine (A Commentary on Statutory Interpretation in Iowa), 11 DRAKE L. 
REV. 3, 5 (1961). Legislative history is raised as part of the broader discussion. See 
generally id. at 8–14.  
 9.  Note, The Inadequacy of Legislative Recording in Iowa, 35 IOWA L. REV. 88, 95 
(1949). 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id.  
 12.  It is also important to know how to find the legislative history sources the court 
is likely to cite, a topic on which this Article will also provide some guidance. 
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illuminates the inherent uncertainties of statutory interpretation. Just as the 
justices may look at the words of the statute itself and find the meaning 
ambiguous, they also may draw different conclusions from that statute’s 
history. This Article will use two recent cases to illustrate the variance in how 
the court decides whether historical analysis applies to a case and, if so, what 
it means. The Iowa Supreme Court has a long history of looking at legislative 
history as part of its interpretation of ambiguous statutes,13 and in the cases 
considered in this study, there is no evidence that the court considers any 
form of legislative history an illegitimate source for understanding a 
statute.14 The question of whether historical consideration, including 
legislative history, applies seems less a philosophical issue and more a 
practical matter of legal analysis. 
These uncertainties in interpretation mean a precise formula for 
correctly reading a statute cannot be formulated; however, some useful 
guidelines can be discerned. Based on the cases construed, this Article 
suggests some practices that will help ensure as thorough a reading of a 
statute as possible and broadly considers some of the uses the court may 
make of historical sources.15 
The relatively narrow focus of this Article should also uniquely 
contribute to the crowded field of statutory interpretation scholarship.16 Part 
 
 13.  See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text; infra notes 108–113 and 
accompanying text. 
 14.  The question of the proper role, if any, of legislative history in statutory 
interpretation has received widespread attention in the legal academy, particularly after 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s Supreme Court confirmation. See, e.g., Fritz Snyder, Legislative 
History and Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit, 49 OKLA. 
L. REV. 573, 573 (1996) (“Ever since Justice Antonin Scalia took his place on the 
Supreme Court in 1986, one area of continuing controversy has been the use of legislative 
history in determining legislative intent.”). In the 10 years following Justice Scalia’s start 
on the Supreme Court, “[w]ell over a hundred law review articles have appeared on this 
topic.” Id. 
 15.  See, e.g., id. at 578. 
 16.  Of the copious publications on statutory interpretation, most have focused on 
the U.S. Supreme Court. Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 
TEX. L. REV. 479, 480 (2013) (“Statutory interpretation scholars have filled shelves of 
law reviews while focusing almost exclusively on the Supreme Court . . . .”). Much 
discussion of legislative history as part of statutory interpretation is also federally 
focused, often noting the attention Justice Scalia has brought to the issue. See, e.g., James 
J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, 
Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 122 (2008); Snyder, 
supra note 14. Empirical studies of courts’ use of legislative history have also focused on 
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II of the Article defines terms. Part III provides an overview of statutory 
drafting and construction in Iowa. Part IV explains the study’s scope, 
methodology, and results. Part V considers lessons from the study beyond 
the quantifiable results, and Part VI recommends two court practices to help 
researchers find and understand the rules regarding use of historical sources 
in statutory interpretation. 
II. DEFINITIONS 
The court may consider a variety of historical sources related to a 
statute. This study coded the following elements, each of which will be 
briefly described below: legislative history, Code history, legislative 
response, legislative acquiescence, contemporaneous circumstances, and 
contemporaneous commentary.17 
The term “legislative history” can convey different meanings. A 
 
the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: 
The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 
1654 (2010) (discussing the analysis of more than 50 years of U.S. opinions that utilize 
legislative history to interpret a statute). However, empirical analyses have also been 
conducted at the state level. See, e.g., Bart M. Davis et al., Use of Legislative History: 
Willow Witching for Legislative Intent, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 585 (2007); William H. Manz, 
If It’s Out There: Researching Legislative Intent in New York, N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 43 (2005); 
WENDY LAMAR, I’M JUST A BILL: CITATIONS TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BY THE 
ARIZONA SUPREME COURT AND UTAH SUPREME COURT 2 (2013), available at https://lib. 
law.washington.edu/lawlibrarianship/CILLPapers/Lamar2013.pdf (student term paper 
discussing “the use of legislative history by the state courts and attempts to find the 
original cases and statutes permitting its use”). In addition, the issue of use of legislative 
history by state courts has also received attention in a less quantitative manner. See, e.g., 
Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices Scalia and 
Breyer and the Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin State Courts, 80 MARQ. L. 
REV. 161 (1997); Stacey L. Gordon & Helia Jazayeri, Lost Legislative Intent: What Will 
Montanans Do When the Meaning Isn’t Plain?, 70 MONT. L. REV. 1 (2009); Russell 
Holder, Say What You Mean and Mean What You Say: The Resurrection of Plain 
Meaning in California Courts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 569 (1997); Steven R. Thorpe, 
Uncovering Legislative History Sources in Tennessee, TENN. B.J., May–June 1995, at 18–
25; Arthur Wang, Legislative History in Washington, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 571 
(1984). Finally, descriptions of state legislative history resources are also plentiful. For 
example, in 2011, Legal Reference Services Quarterly published a themed issue that 
included separate articles on 13 states. See generally Introduction to Special Issue: 
Determining Legislative Intent in State Courts: Selected Methods and Sources, 30 LEGAL 
REFERENCE SERVS. Q. 1, Jan.–June 2011, at 1. 
 17.  Contemporaneous circumstances and contemporaneous commentary were 
coded together as one item. 
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preeminent treatise on statutory interpretation classifies legislative history 
as an extrinsic aid to understanding a statute, noting that other similar aids 
might come from the executive or judicial branch or be nongovernmental.18 
The treatise continues, noting that 
aids can be divided chronologically into: (1) preenactment history, 
including circumstances and events leading up to a bill’s introduction; 
(2) enactment history, including all actions taken and statements made 
during legislative consideration of the original bill from the time of its 
introduction until final enactment; and (3) postenactment history, 
including amendments and any other developments relevant to a 
statute’s operation subsequent to enactment.19 
For the purposes of this Article, legislative history is construed a bit 
more broadly than enactment history, referring to a bill’s history from 
drafting through enactment. 
The other historical elements considered relate to preenactment and 
postenactment histories. For the purposes of this Article, the following 
definitions apply: 
 Code history: the evolution of the subject matter in the Code, prior to or 
after the passage of a particular piece of legislation. 
 Legislative response: legislative action taken in apparent response to a 
related court decision (typically revealed by looking at Code history, 
though sometimes identified through legislative history).20 
 Legislative acquiescence: legislative inaction after one or more related 
court decisions (typically revealed by looking at Code history). 
 Contemporaneous circumstances: the historical context that informed 
the legislature. 
 Contemporaneous commentary: external analysis of a statute concurrent 
with its enactment and implementation. 
 
 18.  2A NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 48:1, at 547 (7th ed. 2014). 
 19.  Id. § 48:1, at 548–50. 
 20.  See, e.g., Schaefer v. Putnam, 841 N.W.2d 68, 81 (Iowa 2013) (“The bill specifies 
that the mediation requirements in Code sections 654A.6 and 654B.3 are jurisdictional 
prerequisites that must be satisfied before a case can be filed under those chapters. A 
1999 federal district court ruling held that the current Code language did not prevent the 
filing of a suit under chapter 654B prior to mediation of the dispute.”) (quoting H.F. 
2521, 78th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess., Explanation (Iowa 2000)). 
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III. CREATING AND INTERPRETING STATUTES IN IOWA: AN 
INTRODUCTION 
The manner in which statutes are drafted in Iowa and the court’s 
framework for statutory interpretation provide essential background 
information. 
A. Drafting Iowa Statutes 
In Iowa, the Legislative Services Agency (LSA), “a nonpartisan, 
central legislative staff agency,”21 drafts bills upon the request of a legislator 
or legislative committee.22 The LSA’s roots run deep, created in 1955 as the 
Legislative Research Bureau (LRB)23 then becoming the Legislative Service 
Bureau (LSB) in 196924 before assuming its current name in 2003.25 Bill 
drafting has been part of the agency’s mission throughout these years, 
although it was not always the exclusive provider of bill-drafting services.26 
Currently, a completed bill request form initiates the drafting process.27 The 
drafter returns the bill to the requesting legislator for review and approval 
or request for further changes.28 
Chamber rules require that a brief explanation be attached to most 
introduced bills. Senate Rule 29 provides, 
 
 21.  IOWA CODE § 2A.1(1) (2013). 
 22.  See id. § 2A.1(2)(a). For additional information on the Legislative Services 
Agency (LSA) see LEGISLATIVE GUIDE: THE IOWA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, LEGAL 
SERVS. DIV. 31–43 (2006), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/resources/gaguid 
e.pdf. 
 23.  Act of May 9, 1955, ch. 48, § 1, 1955 Iowa Acts 75. 
 24.  See Act of June 5, 1969, ch. 69, § 39, 1969 Iowa Acts 84.  
 25.  Act of April 14, 2003, ch. 35, § 1, 2003 Iowa Acts 44 (codified as amended at 
IOWA CODE § 2A.1). 
 26.  See Act of May 9, 1955, ch. 48, § 5(3), 1955 Iowa Acts 76; see also 47 IOWA 
OFFICIAL REG. 98 (1957–1958) (noting the Legislative Research Bureau (LRB) 
functions include bill drafting); William J. Yost, Note, Before a Bill Becomes a Law—
Constitutional Form, 8 DRAKE L. REV. 66, 66 n.1 (1959) (implying that the legislator 
could either draft the bill or ask someone else to draft it). 
 27.  LEGAL SERVS. DIV., supra note 22, at 31–32. 
 28.  Id. at 32. Richard Johnson, Dir., Legal Servs. Div. of the LSA, indicates 
legislators often do request redrafting so that the bill better meets their intent. Richard 
Johnson Discusses Legislative Bill Drafting, Fiscal One-On-One (Nov. 2011), https:// 
www.legis.iowa.gov/DOCS/AudioVideo/fiscalOneOnOne/One-On-One%20Legislativ 
e%20Bill%20Drafting.mp3. 
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 No bill, except appropriation committee bills and simple or 
concurrent resolutions, shall be introduced unless a concise and 
accurate explanation is attached. The chief sponsor or a committee to 
which the bill has been referred may add a revised explanation at any 
time before the last reading, and it shall be included in the daily clip 
sheet.29 
House Rule 27 provides, in relevant part, “All bills and joint 
resolutions introduced shall be prepared by the legislative services agency 
with title, enacting clause, text and explanation as directed by the chief clerk 
of the house.”30 These explanations have been required by rule for many 
decades, dating back to 1941 for the House and 1969 for the Senate.31 
Chamber rules also require that certain types of legislation include a 
fiscal note explaining the law’s financial impact.32 Joint Rule 17 requires 
legislation that “reasonably could have an annual effect of at least one 
hundred thousand dollars or a combined total effect within five years after 
enactment of five hundred thousand dollars” to have a fiscal note attached.33 
The rule excludes “appropriation[s] and ways and means measures where 
the total effect is stated in dollar amounts.”34 These notes, also drafted by 
the LSA, must be attached to the original bill and legislators may request the 
note be revised if an adopted amendment changes the bill’s fiscal effect.35 
 
 29.  S. Res. 5, 85th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2013), available at http://coolice.leg 
is.iowa.gov/Cool-ICE/default.asp?category=billinfo&Service=Billbook&menu=text&h 
bill=SR5&ga=85, reprinted in EIGHTY-FIFTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY SENATE RULES 10 
(2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ChamberRules/SenateRules.pdf. 
 30.  H. Res. 7, 85th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2013), available at http://coolice.le 
gis.iowa.gov/Cool-ICE/default.asp?category=billinfo&Service=Billbook&menu=text& 
hbill=HR7&ga=85, reprinted in EIGHTY-FIFTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY HOUSE RULES 7 
(2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ChamberRules/HouseRules.pdf. 
 31.  EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 6, at 172. 
 32.  H. Con. Res. 5, 85th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2013), available at http://cool 
ice.legis.iowa.gov/Cool-ICE/default.asp?category=billinfo&Service=Billbook&menu=t 
ext&hbill=HCR5&ga=85, as amended by S. Con. Res. 101, 85th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. 
(Iowa 2014), available at http://coolice.legis.iowa.gov/Cool-ICE/default.asp?category=bi 
llinfo&Service=Billbook&menu=text&hbill=SCR101&ga=85, reprinted in EIGHTY-
FIFTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY JOINT RULES 5 (2013) [hereinafter 85th Gen. Assemb. J. 
Rules], available at http://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ChamberRules/JointRules.pdf. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id. 
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Monetary effect is also considered in correctional impact statements.36 
These statements are required for legislation that “proposes a change in the 
law which creates a public offense or significantly changes an existing public 
offense or the penalty for an existing offense.”37 The statement must note 
the effect on the number of criminal cases, cost of confinement, and capacity 
of jails, prisons, and related correctional facilities.38 The LSA prepares these 
statements.39 
Any bill amendments introduced during the legislative process are also 
drafted by the LSA.40 For each legislative session, a bill book is maintained 
that includes all introduced bills and amendments to each.41 This includes all 
amendments introduced, whether adopted or not, as well as any associated 
fiscal notes with correctional impact statements incorporated as relevant.42 
B. Iowa Statutory Construction 
Rules for interpreting Iowa statutes are found in the Code, court rules, 
and judicial precedent.43 Although a comprehensive exposition of Iowa 
statutory construction is beyond the scope of this Article,44 this Part 
introduces the most basic interpretive rules and those that apply to the use 
of historical sources. In addition, this Part discusses the codification of the 
 
 36.  See LEGAL SERVS. DIV., supra note 22, at 37. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id.; IOWA CODE § 2.56(1) (2013). 
 39.  § 2.56(3). 
 40.  LEGAL SERVS. DIV., supra note 22, at 33. Note that although bill amendments 
do not currently have explanations attached, this was apparently not always the case. 
See, e.g., B. Book for H.F. 587, 64th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 1971) at 5, available 
at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/shelves/billbooks/64GA/HF%200587.pdf (including 
an explanation to an amendment to the bill).  
 41.  EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 6, at 171; see generally Bill Book, IOWA 
LEGISLATURE, http://coolice.legis.iowa.gov/Cool-ICE/default.asp?category=billinfo&S 
ervice=Billbook (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). 
 42.  EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 6, at 171–73. 
 43.  See, e.g., §§ 4.1–.14. 
 44.  Such broader analyses of high court statutory interpretation have been 
conducted at the state level elsewhere. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as 
Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New 
Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1771–1811 (2010) (considering Oregon, Texas, 
Connecticut, Michigan, and Wisconsin); Philip A. Talmadge, A New Approach to 
Statutory Interpretation in Washington, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 179 (2001); Adam G. 
Yoffie, From Poritz to Rabner: The New Jersey Supreme Court’s Statutory Jurisprudence, 
2000–2009, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 302 (2011). 
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rule permitting the use of historical sources, including legislative history.45  
1. Statutory Construction Rules 
The Iowa Supreme Court has made it quite clear that, in interpreting 
statutes, it is trying to determine legislative intent.46 Although sometimes 
expressed less emphatically, justices often use language similar to this: “[I]n 
judicially construing applicable statutes, the polestar is unquestionably 
legislative intent.”47 
The words of the statute provide the starting point for determining 
intent.48 In reviewing those words, the court is to take care not to overstep 
its authority and legislate from the bench. The fundamental tenet that, “[i]n 
construing statutes, the court searches for the legislative intent as shown by 
 
 45.  For additional descriptions of Iowa statutory interpretation as it pertains to 
specific subject areas, see 4A B. JOHN BURNS, IOWA PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§ 2:3 (Thomson Reuters Westlaw 2014 ed.); Mark S. Soldat, Penalties and Interest in Iowa 
Workers’ Compensation Law: Statutory Construction, Common-Law Legislation, and 
Everything In-Between and Beyond, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 871, 874–77 (1997); and Brad 
Perri, Note, Financing the Future: Interpreting the “Economic Development Area” 
Provision of the Iowa TIF Statute, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 159, 166–77 (2001). 2A SINGER & 
SINGER, supra note 18, provides a broader and deeper look at rules of statutory 
construction. Although it is not Iowa-specific, this treatise is often cited by the Iowa 
Supreme Court. E.g., Teamsters Local Union No. 421 v. City of Dubuque, 706 N.W.2d 
709, 714 (Iowa 2005) (citing 2A SINGER, supra, § 47.01, at 208) (citing Singer to 
acknowledge that statutory interpretation always begins with the statute’s words); State 
v. Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d 540, 543–44 (Iowa 2000) (citing 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, 
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 47.23–.25, at 315, 318, 319, 325, 327 (6th 
ed. 2000)) (using a prior edition of the treatise to support, among other things, the 
proposition that the search for legislative intent governs statutory interpretation). 
 46.  See, e.g., Hardin Cnty. Drainage Dist. 55, Div. 3, Lateral 10 v. Union Pac. R. 
Co., 826 N.W.2d 507, 512 (Iowa 2013) (“When approaching a statutory construction 
issue, we ‘begin . . . with a firm understanding of our task. It is only to determine the 
intent of the legislature.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Andover Volunteer Fire 
Dep’t v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 787 N.W.2d 75, 81 (Iowa 2010))); Harris v. Olson, 558 
N.W.2d 408, 410 (Iowa 1997) (“Legislative intent, the polestar of statutory 
interpretation, guides our analysis.”) (citing Doe v. Ray, 251 N.W.2d 496, 500 (Iowa 
1977)); Barnes Beauty Coll. v. McCoy, 279 N.W.2d 258, 259 (Iowa 1979) (“The polestar 
is legislative intent. Our task is to search out that intent and, wherever possible, give it 
effect.”). 
 47.  Iowa Dep’t of Revenue v. Iowa Merit Emp’t Comm’n, 243 N.W.2d 610, 614 
(Iowa 1976); accord cases cited supra note 46. 
 48.  See In re Det. of Geltz, 840 N.W.2d 273, 275 (Iowa 2013) (“We look ‘first and 
foremost to the language [the legislature] chose in creating the act.’” (quoting In re Det. 
of Swanson, 668 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Iowa 2003))).  
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what the legislature said, rather than what it should or might have said”49 is 
captured in the Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure as “so well established 
that authorities need not be cited in support of” it.50 Moreover, the court 
“may not extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the meaning of a statute 
under the guise of construction.”51 
However, while the court is not to consider what the legislature 
“should or might have said,”52 the canon of construction expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius53 permits the court to consider what the legislature did not 
say: “When interpreting statutes, we follow the rule that legislative intent is 
‘expressed by omission as well as by inclusion,’”54 although the rule “is 
 
 49.  IOWA R. APP. P. 6.904(3)(m). 
 50.  IOWA R. APP. P. 6.904(3). 
 51.  Mulhern v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 799 N.W.2d 104, 113 (Iowa 2011) (citing 
Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004)). At times, the court 
elaborates on this message. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 1, 6–7 (Iowa 2011) 
(quoting Holland v. State, 115 N.W.2d 161, 164 (1962)) (“It is worth repeating in full 
Justice Thompson’s timeless admonition regarding our court’s role in statutory 
interpretation: 
Why the change was made, why the legislature deemed it proper . . ., we do not 
know, nor is it important that we should understand. Ours not to reason why, 
ours but to read, and apply. It is our duty to accept the law as the legislative 
body enacts it. We do not decide what the legislature might have said, or what 
it should have said in the light of the public interest to be served, but only what 
it did say; and this we must gather from the language actually used. When a 
statute is plain and its meaning clear, there is no room for interpretation; or, to 
put it in another way, there is only one possible construction . . . . 
If we do not follow the clear language of a statute, or of the Constitution, but by 
a fallacious theory of construction attempt to impose our own ideas of what is 
best, even if in so doing we conceive that we are promoting the public welfare 
and achieving a desirable result, we are indulging in judicial legislation and are 
invading the province of the Legislative branch of the Government, or of the 
electorate in amending the basic law. The end does not in such cases justify the 
means. We must accept [the statute] as the legislature wrote it, and its meaning 
is definite and beyond fair debate.” (alterations in original)). 
 52.  IOWA R. APP. P. 6.904(3)(m). 
 53.  See Marcus v. Young, 538 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Iowa 1995) (“[E]xpression of one 
thing is the exclusion of another. This expresses the well-established rules of statutory 
construction that legislative intent is expressed by omission as well as by inclusion, and 
the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others not so mentioned.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 54.  Wiebenga v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 530 N.W.2d 732, 735 
(Iowa 1995) (quoting Barnes v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 385 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Iowa 1986)). 
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subordinate to the primary search for the intention of the legislature.”55 The 
omitted words might be observed when a statute explicitly references one 
Code section but not another56 or includes a list of exceptions, which the 
court presumes to be a complete list.57 Missing language might also be noted 
when comparing two statutes that are very similar.58 
When the written statute is “clear and unambiguous, [the court] 
appl[ies] a plain and rational meaning consistent with the subject matter of 
the statute.”59 In addition to avoiding absurd results, the construction should 
uphold the statute’s purposes.60 A literal interpretation that would lead to 
absurd results contrary to the statute’s purpose makes the statute 
ambiguous.61 A statute is also considered ambiguous when it has more than 
one reasonable interpretation.62 “Ambiguity may arise from specific 
language used in a statute or when the provision at issue is considered in the 
context of the entire statute or related statutes.”63 
 
 55.  Faeth v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 707 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Iowa 2005) 
(citing State v. Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d 540, 543 (Iowa 2000)). 
 56.  See, e.g., Kucera v. Baldazo, 745 N.W.2d 481, 487 (Iowa 2008) (applying Iowa 
Code section 20.18 to city employees but not deputy sheriffs (county employees) in 
noting that the amended Code section references the Chapter on city employees but not 
the Chapter on county employees). But see Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d at 544 (“We conclude 
the omission of section 902.12 from section 232.8(1)(c) does not imply the provisions of 
section 902.12 are excluded from the sentence served by a juvenile for a forcible felony 
applicable to section 902.12. The clear intent of section 232.8(1)(c) is to subject certain 
juvenile offenders to the same treatment as adult offenders.”).  
 57.  E.g., Iowa Farmers Purchasing Ass’n, Inc. v. Huff, 260 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Iowa 
1977) (“[W]here certain exceptions are enumerated, it is presumed the legislature 
intended no others be created.”). 
 58.  E.g., In re Det. of Geltz, 840 N.W.2d 273, 278 (Iowa 2013) (“[T]he legislature is 
aware that the term ‘convicted’ does not include juvenile adjudications, and for that 
reason, section 692A.101(7) expressly mentions juvenile adjudications as an additional 
trigger for registration requirements. By contrast, section 229A.2(11) makes no mention 
of juvenile adjudications.”). 
 59.  ABC Disposal Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 681 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Iowa 
2004) (citing City of Waukee v. City Dev. Bd., 590 N.W.2d 712, 717 (Iowa 1999)). 
 60.  Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 789 N.W.2d 417, 427 (Iowa 
2010) (quoting Case v. Olson, 14 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Iowa 1944)) (noting that even when 
the statute does not seem ambiguous, the court can depart from a literal interpretation 
if it would lead to an absurd, unjust outcome inconsistent with the statute’s purpose). 
 61.  Id. at 427 n.8.  
 62.  See Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1996) (citing Holiday Inns 
Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 537 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa 1995)). 
 63.  Midwest Auto. III, LLC v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 417, 425 (Iowa 
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“Numerous intrinsic aids can help courts discover the intent of a statute 
in the face of an ambiguity.”64 These aids may include a number of canons of 
construction, 65 many of which are codified in Chapter 4 of the Code of Iowa, 
titled “Construction of Statutes.”66 Although this study did not quantify the 
use of all of these canons, in the hundreds of cases consulted it seems clear 
the Iowa Supreme Court’s interpretation of a statute frequently relies on 
reading the statute in whole and in context.67 In part,68 this means the court 
considers the statute’s placement in the Code structure69 (including its title, 
 
2002) (citing State ex rel. Miller v. Midwest Pork, L.C., 625 N.W.2d 694, 700 (Iowa 2001)). 
 64.  Andover Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 787 N.W.2d 75, 82 
(Iowa 2010). The Andover court discussed two intrinsic aids, both of which are rules of 
statutory construction. See id. (“First, we interpret statutes in their context. Second, 
undefined words used in the statute are normally given their ordinary and common 
meaning.” (citation omitted)).  
 65.  See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 
GEO. L.J. 341, 427–31 (2010) (listing 73 different canons and notes that have been 
incorporated, either as an express adoption or rejection, into the Codes of all 50 states 
and the District of Columbia). This tremendously valuable resource contains one 
oversight with regard to Iowa. Under the “Technical Changes” heading in Appendix B, 
“Codified Canons by Legislature,” it should have been noted that Iowa adopted the 
“Written numbers” canon. See IOWA CODE § 4.1(8) (2013); contra Scott, supra, at 428. 
 66.  See generally §§ 4.1–.14. 
 67.  See Judicial Branch v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Linn Cnty., 800 N.W.2d 569, 576 (Iowa 
2011) (“Our job is to consider a statute as a whole, rather than isolated parts.” (citing 
Thoms v. Iowa Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 715 N.W.2d 7, 13 (Iowa 2006))); Rolfe State Bank 
v. Gunderson, 794 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Iowa 2011) (“The overall structure of a statute can 
have strong influence on the meaning of particular words and phrases.” (citing AOL 
LLC v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 771 N.W.2d 404, 409 (Iowa 2009))).  
 68.  Depending on the specific facts of the case, the court may employ a wide variety 
of other interpretive aids in construing statutes. 
 69.  See Rolfe State Bank, 794 N.W.2d at 567 (“At the outset, we regard it as 
unlikely that the legislature would place a significant expansion of the application of 
minority and marketability discounts with respect to a wide variety of transactions in a 
division of the Iowa Banking Act dealing solely with bank mergers. . . . [I]t would have 
more likely placed this language in the general provisions of the Iowa Business 
Corporation Act.”). 
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subtitle, or chapter);70 looks for statutory definitions,71 legislative findings,72 
and statements of purpose;73 harmonizes related Code provisions;74 and 
avoids both rendering words superfluous75 and construing statutes in such a 
way as to not question their constitutionality.76 Subject-specific rules of 
construction may also apply.77 
 
 70.  See, e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Rhinehart, 827 N.W.2d 169, 
176–77 (Iowa 2013) (stating the court’s conclusion that a rule of professional conduct 
applies to behavior in the role of advocate “is buttressed by the fact that this rule is found 
in a section of the rules entitled, ‘Advocate.’”). 
 71.  See, e.g., Rivera v. Woodward Res. Ctr., 830 N.W.2d 724, 730 (Iowa 2013) (“We 
are primarily guided by the definition of the word ‘claim’ provided by our legislature in 
the Act. We are bound to follow statutory definitions and to use them to build the 
foundation of our interpretive analysis.” (citation omitted)). 
 72.  E.g., Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. 
Shell Oil Co., 606 N.W.2d 370, 376 (Iowa 2000) (using legislative findings to determine 
the legislative intent and purpose of the statute). 
 73.  E.g., Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 177–78 (Iowa 2004) 
(examining the statute’s statement of purpose to conclude it “is within the police power 
of the state”). 
 74.  See, e.g., State v. Dann, 591 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Iowa 1999) (citing American 
Asbestos Training Ctr., Ltd. v. E. Iowa Cmty. Coll., 463 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Iowa 1990)) 
(“When more than one statute is pertinent to the inquiry, the court considers the statutes 
together in an attempt to harmonize them.”).  
 75.  Thoms v. Iowa Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 715 N.W.2d 7, 15 (Iowa 2006) 
(determining the correct way to calculate public pension retirement benefits in part 
because the alternative method would render part of the statute unnecessary). 
 76.  State v. Jones, 817 N.W.2d 11, 17 (Iowa 2012) (“[W]e strive to avoid 
constitutional problems when we interpret our rules. If possible, we will construe a rule 
to avoid doubts as to its constitutionality.” (citation omitted)).  
  The principle that we interpret statutes to avoid unconstitutional results 
should be used judiciously. It is only a rule of construction and only one of 
several such rules. When we rely on that rule to reach an implausible 
interpretation when the more plausible interpretation would also be 
constitutional, as it is here, we are reshaping what the legislature gave us and 
exceeding our proper role.  
Id. at 23 (Mansfield, J., concurring specially) (citation omitted).  
 77.  See, e.g., State v. Lindell, 828 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2013) (“[W]e construe criminal 
statutes strictly and resolve doubts in favor of the accused.” (citing State v. Adams, 810 
N.W.2d 365, 369 (Iowa 2012))), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 249. For a more thorough 
discussion of the Iowa Supreme Court’s use of the rule of lenity, see id. at 13 (noting that 
when legislative history clearly indicates legislative intent, the rule of lenity will not apply 
(quoting State v. Hearn, 797 N.W.2d 577, 586 (Iowa 2011))). Tax is another area with 
subject-specific rules of construction. See, e.g., Dial Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 634 
N.W.2d 643, 646 (Iowa 2001) (“Tax exemption statutes are construed strictly, with all 
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Iowa Code Chapter 4 begins with a statement that emphasizes both 
legislative intent and context: “In the construction of the statutes, the 
following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the general assembly, or repugnant 
to the context of the statute . . . .”78 
Among these statutory rules, the Code expressly enumerates seven 
extrinsic aids that “the court, in determining the intention of the legislature, 
may consider among other matters” when interpreting an ambiguous statute, 
including the following historical sources:  
2. The circumstances under which the statute was enacted.  
3. The legislative history.  
4. The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon 
the same or similar subjects.79 
The court has noted that understanding the circumstances under which 
the statute was enacted—contemporaneous circumstances—helps ascertain 
 
doubts resolved in favor of taxation.” (quoting Heartland Lysine, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of 
Revenue & Fin., 503 N.W.2d 587, 588 (Iowa 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Note, too, that the application of another rule of construction—such as considering the 
statute’s purpose—may give rise to additional subject-specific rules. Second Injury Fund 
of Iowa v. Kratzer, 778 N.W.2d 42, 46 (Iowa 2010). “Workers’ compensation statutes are 
to be liberally construed in favor of the employee.” Id. (citing Myers v. F.C.A. Servs., 
Inc., 592 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa 1999)).  
  The legislature enacted the workers’ compensation statute primarily for 
the benefit of the worker and the worker’s dependents. Therefore, we apply the 
statute broadly and liberally in keeping with the humanitarian objective of the 
statute. We will not defeat the statute’s beneficent purpose by reading 
something into it that is not there, or by a narrow and strained construction.  
Id. (quoting Holstein Elec. v. Breyfogle, 756 N.W.2d 812, 815–16 (Iowa 2008)). 
 78.  IOWA CODE § 4.1 (2013). 
 79.  Id. § 4.6 (first item omitted). Iowa is one of several states whose Code expressly 
provides for consideration of legislative history. See Scott, supra note 65, at 419 (listing 
11 states—Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas—that codified a provision allowing 
consideration of legislative history in statutory interpretation under various 
circumstances); see also Mary Whisner, Other Uses of Legislative History, 105 LAW LIBR. 
J. 243, 252–54 (2013) (listing 11 states whose codes explicitly allow the use of legislative 
history in statutory construction—Colorado, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Mexico, 
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas—and another three 
that arguably allow it—Georgia, Hawaii, and Massachusetts). 
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legislative intent to properly interpret the statute.80 A related interpretive 
tool considers contemporaneous understandings of a statutory scheme.81 
This has also been used by the court, in part to supplement legislative 
history.82 
Legislative history is something the court has noted that it is able to 
consider83 and finds instructive.84 The court has also articulated interpretive 
rules specific to bill explanations. This has been primarily expressed as 
acknowledgement that the court “give[s] weight to explanations attached to 
a bill,”85 although, as will be further discussed later, the court appears to be 
in the process of refining this rule.86 When Iowa enacts a law based on a law 
from another jurisdiction or a model or uniform law, the court also looks to 
the history of that legislation in the absence of direct Iowa legislative 
history.87 Changes in the way Iowa enacted the model legislation are also 
considered to indicate legislative intent.88 
The court has sometimes characterized its use of former statutory 
 
 80.  State v. Jenkins, 788 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Iowa 2010). 
 81.  Scott, supra note 65, at 381 & n.222 (considering Section 4.6 a codification of 
this canon, as well as a codification of the allowance of consideration of 
contemporaneous circumstances). 
 82.  See Oyens Feed & Supply, Inc. v. Primebank, 808 N.W.2d 186, 188 (Iowa 2011) 
(noting “[o]ther legislative history is sparse” and therefore considering “[c]ommentators 
contemporaneous [input relevant] to the [statute’s] enactment”). 
 83.  Mulhern v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 799 N.W.2d 104, 113 (Iowa 2011) (citing 
State v. Allen, 708 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Iowa 2006)). 
 84.  Postell v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 823 N.W.2d 35, 49 (Iowa 2012) (citing 
Allen, 708 N.W.2d at 366; Richards v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 362 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Iowa 
1985)).  
 85.  Id. (citing City of Cedar Rapids v. James Props., Inc., 701 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Iowa 
2005)). 
 86.  See infra Part VI.B. 
 87.  See State v. Lindell, 828 N.W.2d 1, 7–8 (Iowa 2013) (“Since the language of the 
statute was derived directly from the Model Anti-Stalking Code, we look to the 
comments from the model code to aid us in determining legislative intent.”), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 249; Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman v. Edwards, 825 N.W.2d 8, 15 n.2 
(Iowa 2012) (“In the absence of instructive Iowa legislative history, we also look to the 
comments and statements of purpose contained in Uniform Acts to guide our 
interpretation of a comparable provision in an Iowa Act.” (quoting Alcor Life Extension 
Found. v. Richardson, 785 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)), reh’g denied (Jan. 16, 2013).  
 88.  See Freedom Fin. Bank v. Estate of Boesen, 805 N.W.2d 802, 814 (Iowa 2011) 
(“We can determine legislative intent from selective enactment or divergence from 
uniform acts.”). 
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provisions as part of legislative history, noting it “consider[s] the legislative 
history of a statute, including prior enactments, when ascertaining legislative 
intent.”89 When considering code history, “[t]he legislature is presumed to 
know the state of the law, including case law, at the time it enacts a statute.”90 
Changes to the relevant Code section(s) are presumed to change the law91 
and apply prospectively.92 However, “remedial or procedural statutes may 
be applied retroactively.”93 To determine whether the statute should be 
applied retroactively, the court will “look at the language of the statute, the 
evil to be remedied, and whether there was an existing statute that governed 
the evil to be remedied.”94 
In addition, in some cases a Code section amendment is viewed as 
merely clarifying the law, rather than changing it, meaning the prior version 
of the statute should be applied as if the clarification were already in place.95 
The intent to clarify can be indicated through legislative history.96 
Clarification can also be shown by the timing of the Code section 
amendment: “When a statute is amended soon after controversy has arisen 
as to the meaning of ambiguous terms in an enactment, the court has reason 
to believe the legislature intended the amendment to provide clarification of 
such terms.”97 Conversely, when the legislature does not amend a Code 
section that the court has interpreted or amends it in such a way that does 
 
 89.  State v. Romer, 832 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Iowa 2013) (quoting In re Estate of 
Bockwoldt, 814 N.W.2d 215, 223 (Iowa 2012)). 
 90.  In re Estate of Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Iowa 2011) (quoting State v. Jones, 
298 N.W.2d 296, 298 (Iowa 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91.  In re Estate of Myers, 825 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2012) (citing Davis v. State, 682 
N.W.2d 58, 61 (Iowa 2004)). 
 92.  IOWA CODE § 4.5 (2013). 
 93.  Hannan v. State, 732 N.W.2d 45, 51 (Iowa 2007); see § 4.5. 
 94.  Hannan, 732 N.W.2d at 51 (citing Bd. of Trs. v. City of W. Des Moines, 587 
N.W.2d 227, 231 (Iowa 1998)). 
 95.  See, e.g., Reilly v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Henry Cnty., 783 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Iowa 
2010) (noting there is no basis to claim retroactive application when an amendment 
clarifies rather than changes the law). 
 96.  See City of Asbury v. Iowa City Dev. Bd., 723 N.W.2d 188, 196 (Iowa 2006). 
“When the legislature amends a statute, we generally presume it intended to change the 
statute’s meaning.” Id. (citing Martin v. Waterloo Cmty. Sch. Dist., 518 N.W.2d 381, 383 
(Iowa 1994)). “However, this presumption can be overcome by legislative history or by 
an explanation accompanying the amendment.” Id. (citing Martin, 518 N.W.2d at 383). 
 97.  Taft v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Linn Cnty., 828 N.W.2d 309, 317 (Iowa 2013) (citing 
Bob Zimmerman Ford, Inc. v. Midwest Auto. I, L.L.C., 679 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Iowa 
2004)). 
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not affect the court’s interpretation of the statute, the court considers this 
legislative acquiescence—evidence that the court has correctly interpreted 
the statute.98 
Adoption dates are also considered when the court cannot harmonize 
two conflicting statutes or otherwise determine which prevails.99 In such a 
case, “the statute latest in date of enactment by the general assembly 
prevails. If provisions of the same Act are irreconcilable, the provision listed 
last in the Act prevails.”100 
2. History of Iowa Code Section 4.6 
At the beginning of Chapter 4, the directive to follow the rules of the 
Chapter unless they are “inconsistent with the manifest intent of the general 
assembly, or repugnant to the context of the statute”101 dates back to the laws 
first enacted when Iowa was still a territory.102 
The provisions in Section 4.6 permitting the courts to turn to legislative 
 
 98.  See, e.g., Richards v. Anderson Erickson Dairy Co., 699 N.W.2d 676, 682 (Iowa 
2005) (“[T]he legislature’s silence over the years is evidence of its tacit approval of our 
construction of the statutory framework.”); see also Welch v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 
Motor Vehicle Div., 801 N.W.2d 590, 599–600 (Iowa 2011). 
 99.  There are additional tools the court uses first to determine which of two 
seemingly incompatible statutes prevails. For example, “[i]f a general provision conflicts 
with a special or local provision, they shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given 
to both. If the conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local 
provision prevails as an exception to the general provision.” IOWA CODE § 4.7 (2013). 
 100.  Id. § 4.8; accord Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 808 N.W.2d 417, 429 
(Iowa 2011) (citing Section 4.8 to support the conclusion that of two seemingly 
conflicting statutes, the later enacted one would take precedence). 
 101.  § 4.1. 
 102.  As part of an Act entitled “Construction of Statutes,” the 1839 Statute Laws of 
the Territory of Iowa provided, “In the construction of all statutes the following rules 
shall be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest 
intent of the legislature, or repugnant to the context of the same statute . . . .” THE 
STATUTE LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF IOWA 77 (1839). The Section continues, providing 
17 interpretive rules related to interpretation of words and phrases. Id. at 77–79. Some 
of these interpretive rules are still present in the current provisions, with the addition of 
several others. See generally § 4.1. In an article that provides interesting observations 
about the nineteenth-century conception of the phrase “intention of the legislature,” the 
author notes that the quoted language, which originated in the Iowa Territorial Code of 
1839, was later adopted in Oregon. Jack L. Landau, The Intended Meaning of 
“Legislative Intent” and Its Implications for Statutory Construction in Oregon, 76 OR. L. 
REV. 47, 60 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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history, Code history, and contemporaneous circumstances do not date to 
territorial times. They were adopted in 1971, when Iowa’s 64th General 
Assembly unanimously enacted House File 587.103 As noted in the Bill’s 
explanation, it adopted “the majority of the provisions of the uniform 
statutory construction act not already contained in chapter 4 of the Code.”104 
This result was not changed during the Bill’s enactment history, wherein a 
single amendment defining the terms “shall,” “must,” and “may,” was 
adopted.105 The Iowa General Assembly adopted Section 4.6 substantially 
verbatim from the Uniform Act.106 In the Uniform Act, the comment to this 
Section notes, “Although none of the mentioned extrinsic aids is to be 
controlling, the list simply provides a persuasive indication of the original 
legislative intent.”107 Similarly, the explanation of the enacted Iowa Bill 
notes, 
 Other provisions of this Act establish guidelines for the 
interpretation of statutes. While the courts may not be bound to follow 
such rules in all cases, the existence of them cannot be ignored and they 
should aid in the interpretation of statutes. Iowa courts have in most 
cases held the proposed rules to be the law in Iowa.108 
As indicated in the explanation, the adoption was seen as a codification 
of Iowa common law.109 The bill drafting file, available at the State Archives, 
underscores that the Bill was seen as a codification of existing court 
 
 103.  See Act of May 24, 1971, ch. 77, § 4, 1971 Iowa Acts 99, 99; see also H. JOURNAL, 
64th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. 977 (Iowa 1971) (documenting there were 90 aye 
votes, 0 nay votes, and 10 absences or abstentions). 
 104.  H.F. 587, 64th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 1971), at Explanation. The 
referenced uniform law is the MODEL STATUTORY CONSTR. ACT § 15, 14 U.L.A. 765–66 
(1965). 
 105.  See H. JOURNAL, supra note 103, at 976-77 (showing adoption of the 
amendment including the definitions of these terms); see also B. Book for Iowa H.F. 587, 
available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/shelves/billbooks/64GA/HF%200587.pdf 
(showing there were no other adopted amendments). 
 106.  Compare IOWA CODE § 4.6, with MODEL STATUTORY CONSTR. ACT § 15, 14 
U.L.A. 765. When enacting the law, the Iowa Legislature changed the Model Act Section 
by replacing semicolons at the end of each list item with periods and adding the words 
“or statement of policy” to the end of “7. The preamble.” Compare Act of May 24, 1971, 
ch. 77, § 4, 1971 Iowa Acts 99, 99, with MODEL STATUTORY CONSTR. ACT § 15, 14 U.L.A. 
765. 
 107.  MODEL STATUTORY CONSTR. ACT, § 15 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 766. 
 108.  Iowa H.F. 587, at Explanation. 
 109.  See id. 
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practices.110 Then-LSB Director Serge Garrison championed the Bill,111 
noting in a memo to then-State Representative Richard F. Drake that it 
“would be of benefit for bill drafting purposes and resolving a lot of doubts 
as to interpretation and intent.”112 In that same memo, Garrison notes that 
after extensively researching the Bill, he asked former Iowa Supreme Court 
Chief Justice Theodore Garfield to review it, and Justice Garfield “agreed 
that it expresses the law in Iowa and also agreed that it would be useful to 
insert such law into the statutes.”113 
The bill drafting file also includes a memo from Garrison with a more 
extensive explanation of the Bill that explains its purpose: 
 The purpose of the codification is to put the General Assembly on 
record as agreeing with previous judicial holdings so that legislation may 
be written fully understanding the rules that will be used to interpret the 
legislation. The codification will allow any person interested in 
legislation to refer to the statutes in order to determine how such 
statutes might be interpreted.114 
In addition, the bill drafting file contains an extensive memo that both 
compares “the Uniform Statutory Construction Act and Iowa statutory and 
case law” and also notes “which extrinsic aids the Supreme Court of Iowa 
uses, or might use if they were made available as part of the legislative 
 
 110.  In the years studied by this Article, the court did not cite materials from the bill 
drafting file. These materials are more removed from the legislature than items in the 
bill book. In many cases, the files might not have much additional information beyond 
the bill request form and the original bill draft. However, in this case, the bill drafting 
file contained a wealth of information, including the memos cited infra notes 111–15. For 
more information about these files, including which files can be accessed and how to 
obtain them, see Iowa Legislative History, DRAKE LAW LIBRARY, http://libguides.law.dr 
ake.edu/IowaLegHist (last updated Dec. 3, 2014), at Step 8: Bill Drafting Files. 
 111.  As the head of the unit tasked with drafting bills, Garrison would naturally have 
specific interest in this Bill. See 53 IOWA OFFICIAL REGISTER 1969–70 118 (L. DALE 
AHERN ED. 1969). LSB services were to be objective. Id. at 117. Garrison recognized the 
possible conflict with his advocacy, noting, “I do not know if I would have to register as 
a lobbyist for this bill, however I think it has a great deal of merit.” Memorandum from 
Serge H. Garrison, Dir., Iowa Legislative Services Bureau (LSB), to Charles H. Pelton, 
Iowa State Rep. 1 (Jan. 11, 1971) (on file with Author). 
 112.  Memorandum from Serge H. Garrison, Dir., Iowa LSB, to Richard F. Drake, 
Iowa State Rep. 2 (March 12, 1971) (on file with Author). 
 113.  Id. at 1. 
 114.  Memorandum from Serge H. Garrison, Dir., Iowa LSB, Explanation of H. File 
587 Enacting Rules of Statutory Construction 1 (Apr. 12, 1971) (on file with Author). 
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history of a statute, in determining legislative intent.”115 Prepared by LRB 
staff member Jim Wisby at Garrison’s request several years before the 
enacting legislation was introduced,116 the memo cites cases in which the 
court has already applied similar rules to those of Sections 13–25 of the 
Uniform Act.117 Considering Section 15, the basis for what became Iowa 
Code Section 4.6, the three cited cases mentioning legislative history indicate 
it has no effect when the statute is unambiguous, but it can be considered 
when the statute is ambiguous.118 
The memo also considers the specific legislative history sources the 
court might use, discussing available materials, providing some examples of 
sources cited in the past, and recommending a few changes.119 The memo 
notes that not all of the sources considered include the type of information 
the courts would find most useful in ascertaining intent.120 Over the years, 
some of these sources have become more accessible, but they still do not 
have the kinds of statements of intent Wisby recommended.121 
The memo begins by discussing the legislative journals, widely 
available both then and now.122 Wisby provides an example of the court 
citing the journals when referring to adopted bill amendments in interpreting 
a statute.123 He also notes that standing committee reports are accessible 
because they are reprinted in the journals, but they are not very useful 
because they do not contain sufficient detail explaining the committee’s 
recommendations about whether the Bill should pass.124 Wisby suggests 
adding “an explanation of the committee’s reasons for [the] 
 
 115.  Staff Memorandum from Iowa LRB 1 (Oct. 10, 1968) [hereinafter Staff Memo]. 
 116.  See Garrison, supra note 112, at 1. 
 117.  See generally Staff Memo, supra note 115, at 2–13. 
 118.  Id. at 5 (citing City of Emmetsburg v. Gunn, 86 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 1957); Iowa–
Ill. Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Bettendorf, 41 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1950); Indep. Sch. Dist. of 
Cedar Rapids v. Iowa Emp’t Sec. Comm’n, 25 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1946)). Note, too, that 
the cited 1946 case reinforces the court’s established practice of turning to legislative 
history to ascertain intent. Indep. Sch. Dist. of Cedar Rapids, 25 N.W.2d at 496 (“We 
have frequently held that history of legislation may properly be considered in case of 
ambiguity.”). 
 119.  Staff Memo, supra note 115, at 13–20. 
 120.  See id. at 20. 
 121.  It is unclear what kind of consideration the recommendations in the memo were 
given beyond the fact that they were seen by Serge Garrison, then-Director of the LRB. 
 122.  Staff Memo, supra note 115, at 13–14. 
 123.  Id. at 13 (citing Lever Bros. Co. v. Erbe, 87 N.W.2d 469 (Iowa 1958)). 
 124.  Id. at 13–14. 
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recommendation, as well as a statement of its understanding of the nature, 
purpose and effect of the bill.”125 This recommendation has not been 
adopted.126 
Study committee reports are noted as a potentially valuable source of 
legislative history information—and one the court has endorsed in the 
past.127 Here, Wisby also states, “A specific statement of the study 
committee’s intent as to the purposes of a particular study bill, or comments 
to that effect following the sections within the bill, would be a valuable aid 
to Iowa courts in construing a statute based on that study bill.”128 He also 
recommends the statement of intent be republished in the journals, 
presumably to make it easier to access, because at the time these reports 
were only available through the LSB.129 The recommendation to include 
such a statement in the journals has not been adopted.  
Even though these statements are not in the journals, it has become 
much easier to access interim study committee reports in the Internet era.130 
These reports include potentially useful information, such as study bills 
arising from the committee work, the committee charge, summaries of 
meetings or testimony before the committee, recommendations, and a list of 
materials distributed for the committee’s meetings, which are on file with the 
LSA.131 If the study committee formulates a study bill, the committee 
sponsorship should be noted on the study bill.132 Any subsequent house or 
senate files introduced on the basis of a study bill should have that study bill 
number referenced in the bill history, allowing a researcher to trace the bill 
back to the related interim study committee report.133 However, if the bill 
 
 125.  Id. at 14. 
 126.  See, e.g., S. JOURNAL, 85th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. 298 (Iowa 2014) 
(recommending S.F. 2240 for approval without explanation). 
 127.  Staff Memo, supra note 115, at 14 (citing Yarn v. City of Des Moines, 54 N.W.2d 
439 (Iowa 1952)). 
 128.  Id. at 15. 
 129.  Id. at 14–15. 
 130.  For options for accessing interim study committee reports, see supra note 110, 
at Step 7: Reports. 
 131.  See generally Committees, IOWA LEGISLATURE, https://www.legis.iowa.gov/com 
mittees (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
 132.  See, e.g., S. Study B. 3164, 82d Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Iowa 2008), available at 
http://coolice.legis.iowa.gov/Cool-ICE/default.asp?Category=BillInfo&Service=Billboo 
k&ga=82&hbill=SSB3164 (noting study bill was “recommended by Freedom of 
Information, Open Meetings, and Public Records Interim Study Committee”). 
 133.  See B. History for S.F. 2378, 82d Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Iowa 2008), available 
  
262 Drake Law Review [Vol. 63 
 
was not directly created through interim study committee work but was 
instead inspired by study committee recommendations, nothing routinely 
recorded in the bill history indicates the connection.134 This standard is 
deliberate because the legislation as introduced may vary from the study 
committee recommendations, and an overt connection between the two may 
misleadingly suggest the bill completely endorses the study committee 
work.135 
Wisby did not find any examples of the court consulting the minutes of 
standing or study committee meetings or hearings, which he attributed to the 
fact that “no official verbatim record of such meetings and hearings has been 
kept in Iowa,”136 although minutes summarizing those meetings and hearings 
were available then, as they are today.137 He discusses a then-current 
proposal to begin recording standing committee minutes as well.138 Those 
minutes are now recorded and, for recent years, are easily available through 
the General Assembly website.139 
Wisby discusses the problem with using the comments of individual 
legislators to ascertain legislative intent—not knowing whether the 
comments of one individual reflect the sentiment of the majority.140 After 
noting the same argument could also be applied to committee meeting and 
hearing statements, Wisby notes a then-current proposal for LSB to begin 
recording audio of floor debates.141 Wisby believes the Iowa Supreme Court 
 
at http://coolice.legis.iowa.gov/Cool-ICE/default.asp?Category=BillInfo&Service=Dsp 
History&var=SF&key=1075B&GA=82 (last visited Nov. 12, 2014) (noting it was 
formerly S. Study B. 3164). 
 134.  Telephone interview with Richard Johnson, Dir., Legal Servs. Div. of the LSA 
(June 18, 2014). 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Staff Memo, supra note 115, at 15. 
 137.  Id. at 16. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Accessing these minutes does involve a few steps. On the Committees page of 
the General Assembly site, https://www.legis.iowa.gov/committees, a gray bar above the 
heading “Standing Committees” provides the current General Assembly number. This 
can be changed by clicking on the green down-arrow at the far right of that bar. Select 
the desired General Assembly (minutes will not be available for all listed General 
Assemblies). Then click on the committee of interest. When that committee page opens, 
the selected General Assembly number should still be in the gray bar. Near the bottom 
of the page under the heading “Committee Information,” click on the link titled 
“Meetings.” Available minutes will be linked under the column headed “Minutes.”  
 140.  Staff Memo, supra note 115, at 16–17. 
 141.  Id. at 17–18.  
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might be able to use the recordings in statutory interpretation, noting that it 
has used “constitutional debates in construing ambiguous constitutional 
provisions.”142 The 1968 proposal to record chamber debate appears to have 
been unsuccessful, although live audio streams are now available.143 In 
addition, recorded video has been available for both chambers since 2013.144 
Connecting recorded floor action with a particular bill can be done through 
the online bill book where the LSA includes links to senate and house video 
archives related to a particular bill.145 The court has not yet used this source 
to construe a statute. Possibly, the court would deem it an unreliable source 
to ascertain legislative intent for the reasons Wisby discussed but 
dismissed.146 However, the court has given some indication it would be 
willing to cite floor debate.147 In a 2011 case, it lamented the lack of Iowa 
legislative history available, specifically noting, “As with most Iowa statutes, 
there are no committee hearings or floor debates to review.”148 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IOWA SUPREME COURT’S USE OF 
HISTORICAL SOURCES 
With definitions and statutory interpretation background established, 
this Article now turns to a study of Iowa Supreme Court opinions. This Part 
explains the scope and methodology and presents quantifiable results. 
A. Scope and Methodology 
Several Lexis Advance and WestlawNext searches149 identified Iowa 
 
 142.  Id. at 18–19.  
 143.  Email from Jeff Van Engelenhoven, Div. Editor/Supervisor, Computer Servs. 
Div., Iowa Legis. Servs. Agency, to Author (June 22, 2014) (on file with Author). A live 
stream provides a service to those who want to listen to legislative floor activities in real 
time. However, because it is not recorded, it cannot be referenced at a later point in time, 
so it is not useful for purposes of statutory interpretation. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  See, e.g., S.F. 2240, 85th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Iowa 2014), available at http:// 
coolice.legis.iowa.gov/Cool-ICE/default.asp?Category=billinfo&Service=Billbook&hbi 
ll=SF2240&section=1&GA=85&version=Enrol. 
 146.  See Staff Memo, supra note 115, at 16–17. 
 147.  See Oyens Feed & Supply, Inc. v. Primebank, 808 N.W.2d 186, 188 (Iowa 2011). 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  A keyword and a topical search were run in each system. The final data set was 
the compilation of all search results after removing any duplicate cases. The keyword 
search on WestlawNext was run by first limiting the sources to be searched to “Iowa 
Supreme Court Cases,” entering “adv: legislat! /5 (inten! or history),” and filtering 
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Supreme Court cases decided in the years 2004–2013 involving 
interpretation of an Iowa statute or Iowa court rule.150 Each case in this 
initial data set was coded to indicate the author of the majority opinion and 
the primary area of law involved.151 Additional coding was based not on the 
case as a whole but on the main statute the opinion construed.152 The data 
set was refined to exclude certain types of analyses outside the scope of the 
study. Laws interpreted primarily to answer questions of constitutionality or 
interpretation of administrative regulations were excluded.153 In cases where 
an administrative agency interpreted the statute before the question came to 
the court, the court typically engaged in the analysis of at least two statutes; 
the first was an analysis of Iowa Code Section 17A.19 to determine the 
deference to be given to an agency interpretation.154 This discussion was 
 
results with a date range limit of 01/01/2004 to 12/31/2013. (As a note on the functionality 
of WestlawNext, the same search run without first limiting the source to “Iowa Supreme 
Court Cases” yields many fewer Iowa cases—a good reminder that despite the ease of 
searching across all content types when there are certain content areas a researcher 
wants to cover comprehensively, it is a good idea to limit searches to those areas before 
executing them.) In Lexis Advance, the search “legislat! /5 (inten! or history)” was run 
in the source “IA Supreme Court Cases from 1839.” A postsearch filter limited the date 
from 01/01/2004 to 12/31/2013. For the topical searches in Lexis Advance, cases with 
“{Topic: Interpretation}” from the source “IA Supreme Court Cases from 1839” were 
selected and then the same date limit applied. In WestlawNext, content was limited to 
“Iowa Supreme Court Cases,” and the search “adv: DI(361)” was run. (The 361 topic in 
the West KeyNumber system is Statutes.) The results were then limited to the identified 
date range. The topical searches yielded fewer results than the keyword searches, 
suggesting that some cases that interpreted a statute did not have a related headnote—a 
fact confirmed when reviewing the search results. This means that any statutory 
interpretation cases over the 10-year time period would not have been identified if they 
did not have a “Statutes” headnote in Westlaw, an “Interpretation” headnote in Lexis, 
or fit the keyword criteria (which included the concept of legislative intent). 
 150.  See Fisher v. Davis, 601 N.W.2d 54, 60 (Iowa 1999) (“[Court r]ules have the 
force and effect of statutes. Consequently, we interpret rules in the same manner we 
interpret statutes.” (citation omitted)). 
 151.  To try to ensure consistency, the area of law was identified by the WestlawNext 
summary. 
 152.  Because the court reads statutes in whole and in context, see supra note 67, 
discussion of one statute often led to discussion of others, but only the jumping-off 
statute was noted in the data collection. 
 153.  Note, however, administrative regulations are construed very similarly to 
statutes. See Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 744 N.W.2d 640, 643 
(Iowa 2008) (“We have applied nearly identical rules for the construction of statutes to 
the construction of administrative rules.” (citing Hollinrake v. Iowa Law Enforcement 
Acad., 452 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1990))). 
 154.  See, e.g., Sunrise Ret. Cmty. v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 833 N.W.2d 216, 
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excluded,155 but the other questions of statutory interpretation—those 
involving the dispute at issue—were selected. The selected construed 
statutes form the “statutory interpretation data set.”156 
The statutory interpretation data set was further refined to select those 
construed statutes wherein the majority opinion significantly incorporated157 
historical sources in its analysis. For these statutes, the type of historical 
information cited was also coded.158 For cases that cited legislative history 
sources, additional coding noted the specific sources of legislative history 
cited159 and whether the opinion cited Iowa Code Section 4.6 in support of 
its use of legislative history. In addition, a general assessment of the court’s 
use of the cited historical information was also noted for each statute 
construed. This was coded as follows: 
(1) if the court relied on that information in determining the meaning 
of the statute, 
 
219 (Iowa 2013); Iowa Med. Soc’y v. Iowa Bd. Of Nursing, 831 N.W.2d 826, 838–39 (Iowa 
2013). 
 155.  For a discussion of how the court engages in this analysis, see Renda v. Iowa 
Civil Rights Comm’n, 784 N.W.2d 8, 10–14 (Iowa 2010). Note that this discussion relies 
on a type of relatively rare Iowa historical source: a report providing contemporaneous 
commentary. Specifically, the Renda court often cites ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, 
AMENDMENTS TO IOWA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, REPORT ON SELECTED 
PROVISIONS TO IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION AND IOWA STATE GOVERNMENT 
(1998). Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 11, 14, 15. Part of the reason the agency-deference portion 
of the decision was not coded was to avoid skewing the data to overrepresent such 
reports. 
 156.  Primarily, each statute construed came from a separate case, but two cases 
construed two relevant statutes completely independently of each other, and each were 
selected for separate coding. The only historical source cited by the “second” statute in 
each of these cases was Code history. 
 157.  “Significant” does not mean the opinion hinged on the historical material, but 
it does mean it included more than a mere mention of the date when a statute was 
enacted. Opinions were also not selected if the court was relying on precedent and simply 
mentioned that a prior case had considered historical sources. However, if the opinion 
proceeded to discuss that history, it was selected. The study erred in favor of selecting 
borderline cases. 
 158.  That is, legislative history, Code history, legislative response, legislative 
acquiescence, or contemporaneous circumstances/commentary. See supra Part II. 
 159.  Note that when a discrepancy was discovered between the citation in the 
opinion and the actual information cited, coding was for the actual information cited. 
For example, if the court cited a bill but quoted from its explanation, the explanation 
was coded. 
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(2) if the court used that information to support an interpretation 
arrived at through other means, or 
(3) if the information primarily provided context or background that 
may have informed the interpretation but was not the basis for it. 
Although most coded data relied on fairly objective standards, there 
was some subjectivity involved, particularly when assigning a value to the 
court’s use of the historical sources. (In an effort to increase consistency, the 
Author coded everything herself but recognizes the imprecision of coding 
this last data point.) 
B. Results 
The combined search results of the initial data set yielded 430 unique 
cases. Of those, 56 were outside the scope of the study because the primary 
consideration of the Iowa statute related to its constitutionality (41) or 
because they construed a non-Iowa statute (9), municipal ordinance (2), or 
Iowa administrative regulation (4). The remaining 374 cases formed the 
statutory interpretation data set. Of these, 138 (37 percent) used at least one 
type of historical analysis in the opinion.160 Thus, for the period studied, the 
court considered some form of history related to the statute in a sizable 
minority (more than one-third) of its statutory interpretation cases that were 
identified in this study. 
The specific types of historical sources considered follows. Sixty-four 
cases considered legislative history. One hundred eight cases considered at 
least one of the following related elements: Code history (99), legislative 
response (20), or legislative acquiescence (17). Twenty-seven cases 
considered contemporaneous circumstances/ commentary.161 Law review 
articles comprised the primary source for the latter, although the court also 
drew upon other sources, including LSA Summaries of Legislation, treatises, 
federal government reports, American Law Reports annotations, other 
states’ statutes in force at the time Iowa adopted provisions on the same 
subject, historical discussion in other cases, and historic events.162 The court 
 
 160.  As further discussed supra note 156, two of these cases used historical sources 
in construing two different relevant statutes; while the total number of cases using 
historical sources was 138, the total number of statutes considered was 140. 
 161.  When the number of cases associated with each of these three categories is 
totaled, the result is more than 138 because some cases considered more than one 
category of historical analysis. 
 162.  E.g., Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 808 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa 
2011) (citing Watergate as instrumental in bringing campaign finance reform to Iowa). 
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has exhibited a willingness to consider a wide range of sources that might 
help it interpret a statute consistent with legislative intent. 
Looking more closely at the 64 cases that considered legislative history, 
33 considered Iowa legislative history, 24 considered the legislative history 
of the statute on which the Iowa provision was modeled, and seven 
considered the legislative history of both the Iowa statute and the model 
legislation. In total, 40 of the cases in the statutory interpretation data set 
considered Iowa legislative history. In other words, over the sample 10-year 
period, the court cited Iowa legislative history sources in almost 11 percent 
of all the identified cases in which it interpreted an Iowa statute for reasons 
other than evaluating its constitutionality. Although this is certainly a 
minority of statutory interpretation cases, it is not a trivial minority. 
Moreover, as discussed below, it possibly underrepresents the number of 
cases in which legislative history might have been usefully employed.163 
Table 1 provides the specific Iowa legislative history sources cited. 
Note that bill explanations were used as a source of Iowa legislative history 
almost twice as much as the next most commonly consulted source, the act 
text (in its session law form).164 In addition, the chart footnotes indicate the 
cases that cite each form of Iowa legislative history, providing easy access to 
examples of the court’s uses of these sources.165 
Table 1 
Source Number of Opinions Citing Source 
Explanation 21 
Act text 12 
Bill amendment that passed 8 
Act summary166 5 
Fiscal note 4 
Prior bill/study bill 2 
Drafter’s comments or report 2 
 
 163.  See discussion infra Part V.B.5. 
 164.  See infra Table 1. The usage rate of explanations would still be the highest, but 
by a smaller margin, if the act text is combined with the act summary and title. 
 165.  For citations associated with the “Number of Opinions Citing Source” column 
within Table 1 see infra Appendix. 
 166.  This appears at the top of the Bill directly under the bill number and begins 
with the words “AN ACT.” Two opinions referred to it as the title, but the quoted 
sections clearly came from the summary, so that is how they were coded. 
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Act title167 1 
Bill amendment that failed 1 
Bill title 1 
As noted in Table 1, the act text was cited in 12 cases.168 There were 
several reasons the court may have cited the act text rather than the Code. 
Sometimes the provision was codified but no longer appeared in the current 
Code at the time the opinion was written.169 Sometimes the provision was 
never codified; among these 12 cases, two opinions cite to uncodified 
sections titled “legislative findings and declaration”170 and “legislative 
intent,”171 respectively.172 Two other cases cite to untitled first sections.173 
One begins, “It is the purpose of this Act . . . .,”174 and the other includes 
legislative findings and a statement of intent.175 The court may look at the 
act to consider related provisions in order to get a better sense of the act’s 
overall purpose. This analysis can also help the court understand the 
relationship between the statute under consideration and other statutes that 
may have been modified by the same act.176 
As explained in the scope and methodology, the extent to which the 
 
 167.  The act title appears at the top of the bill directly under the chapter number. 
 168.  See supra Table 1. 
 169.  See, e.g., Sierra Club Iowa Chapter v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 832 N.W.2d 636, 
643, 645 (Iowa 2013) (quoting 1974 Iowa Acts ch. 1090, § 9, noting its 1975 codification). 
 170.  See Schaefer v. Putnam, 841 N.W.2d 68, 79 (Iowa 2013), as corrected (Dec. 18, 
2013) (quoting 1990 Iowa Acts ch. 1143, § 1). 
 171.  See Drake Univ. v. Davis, 769 N.W.2d 176, 185 (Iowa 2009) (quoting 2004 1st 
Extraordinary Session Iowa Acts, ch. 1001, § 20). 
 172.  Similar sections are sometimes codified. Some of the opinions reviewed cited 
these codified sections, but they were, of course, not counted as a citation to legislative 
history. This does underscore the importance of reading statutes in whole and in context, 
as discussed supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 173.  See State v. Tesch, 704 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Iowa 2005) (quoting 1986 Iowa Acts 
ch, 1178, § 1); Scholte v. Dawson, 676 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Iowa 2004) (quoting 1975 Iowa 
Acts ch. 239, § 1). 
 174.  1986 Iowa Acts, ch. 1178, § 1; see Tesch, 704 N.W.2d at 451 (quoting 1986 Iowa 
Acts ch. 1178, § 1). 
 175.  1975 Iowa Acts ch. 239, §1; see Scholte, 676 N.W.2d at 191 (quoting 1975 Iowa 
Acts ch. 239, § 1). 
 176.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Whalen, 827 N.W.2d 184, 190 (Iowa 2013), reh’g denied 
(Mar. 8, 2013) (“The best evidence that the legislature intended [a provision] to govern 
the final disposition of a decedent’s remains to the exclusion of any common law 
obligation to implement the decedent’s wishes can be found by examining the 
simultaneous changes the legislature made to . . . the Iowa Cemetery Act.”). 
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court relied on its historical analysis was coded as 1 (relied on), 2 
(supported), or 3 (background).177 Table 2 provides that data by type of 
historical information. Note that in about 36 percent of construed statutes 
citing Code history, that information was presented primarily as 
background, whereas this was only the case 10 percent of the time for cited 
Iowa legislative history. In other words, Iowa legislative history may be less 
frequently cited than Code history, but its use is proportionately more likely 
to influence the decision. 
Table 2 
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1 50 22 13 37 10 5 11 
2 45 14 11 28 8 10 9 
3 45 4 7 36 2 2 7 
 
Cases were also coded based on the author of the majority opinion. 
Table 3 notes the total number of opinions in the statutory interpretation 
data set that each justice authored and how many of these opinions cited 
historical sources according to the study parameters. During the period 
studied, each justice cited historical sources to some extent, ranging from a 
low of 20 percent of their statutory interpretation cases (Justice Louis 
Lavorato) to a high of 61.1 percent (Justice Edward Mansfield). 
It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from this data. The different 
rates of citation of historical sources may relate more to the particular statute 
 
 177.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 178.  The coding for the extent to which the court relied on historical sources was 
specific to the statute construed, not the source used. See supra note 156. The total of all 
the source-specific numbers in the chart (236) exceeds the number of relevant statutes 
construed (140 in 138 cases) because the statutory analysis frequently cited more than 
one type of historical data. 
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being construed, the arguments raised by the parties, or the historical 
sources available than the justice writing the majority opinion. However, it 
does clearly demonstrate that all justices who served on the Iowa Supreme 
Court during the time period studied have authored opinions that cite to 
historical sources as part of the court’s analysis. To the extent that the 
individual justice’s preference for citing historical materials accounts for any 
of the differences in citation rates, historical sources may be increasingly 
important to consider. The seven justices currently on the court have the 
highest percentage use of historical materials in their statutory 
interpretation cases. 
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Mansfield 
(2011-2013) 11 7 18 61.1% 
Waterman 
(2011-2013) 13 10 23 56.5% 
Zager 
(2011-2013) 
9 11 20 45.0% 
Cady 
(2004-2013) 20 25 45 44.4% 
Hecht 
(2006-2013) 15 20 35 42.9% 
Appel 
(2006-2013) 
12 20 32 37.5% 
Wiggins 
(2004-2013) 21 40 61 34.4% 
Carter 
(2004-2006) 5 10 15 33.3% 
Ternus 
(2004-2010) 
11 25 36 30.6% 
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Baker 
(2008-2010) 4 11 15 26.7% 
Larson 
(2004-2008) 
5 15 20 25.0% 
Streit 
(2004-2010) 11 36 47 23.4% 
Lavorato 
(2004-2006) 1 4 5 20.0% 
Per Curiam 0 2 2 0.0% 
 
Table 4 provides the area of law listed in the WestlawNext summary 
for each case, noting those that cited historical sources and those that did 
not. Again, it is difficult to identify clear implications from this data. The 
sample of cases interpreting statutes was too small in some areas, such as 
agriculture and securities regulation, to draw any conclusions. Other areas, 
such as criminal justice, provided a more robust case sample. Thirty percent 
of those cases used historical sources. Although that percentage is likely to 
fluctuate, it seems reasonable to infer that historical sources will remain 
relevant to a significant minority of criminal justice cases. 
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Agriculture 1 0 1 100.0% 
Business 
Organizations 
1 0 
1 100.0% 
Civil Rights 1 2 3 33.3%
Commercial Law 5 4 9 55.6%
Criminal Justice 34 78 112 30.4%
Education 7 10 17 41.2%
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Energy and 
Utilities 1 5 6 16.7%
Environmental 
Law 
1 1 
2 50.0%
Estate Planning 
and Probate 8 5 13 61.5%
Family Law 12 8 20 60.0%
Finance and 
Banking 
1 0 
1 100.0% 
Government 19 23 42 45.2%
Government 
Contracts 0 2 2 0.0%
Health 9 13 22 40.9%
Insurance 5 9 14 35.7%
Labor and 
Employment 
9 33 
42 21.4%
Legal Services 2 6 8 25.0%
Litigation 1 4 5 20.0%
Maritime Law 0 1 1 0.0%
Native 
Americans
0 2 
2 0.0%
Products 
Liability 1 1 2 50.0%
Real Property 9 10 19 47.4%
Securities 
Regulation 0 1 1 0.0%
Taxation 5 6 11 45.5%
Torts 4 8 12 33.3%
Transportation 2 4 6 33.3%
V. IMPLICATIONS 
The numerical data quantifies the court’s use of historical 
considerations and specific sources of legislative history. Beyond the 
numbers, the study reveals the rather elusive nature of statutory 
interpretation. Although rules dominate the task of interpreting a statute, 
their application can be uncertain. 
  
2015] Does the Past Predict the Future? 273 
 
A. Statutory Interpretation Is an Art That Sometimes Masquerades as a 
Science179 
This Part illustrates two of the vagaries of statutory interpretation. 
First, the court does not consistently find the same interpretive rules 
compelling in all cases. In part, this naturally flows from the specific facts of 
the case and can even be rather predictable. However, sometimes a rule 
seemingly should apply and may not be used or even recognized in the 
majority opinion. Second, when the court turns to historical sources, 
individual justices may interpret these in different ways, meaning the source 
that was meant to illuminate the intent of the ambiguous statute may well be 
ambiguous itself. Historical sources do not always act as beacons, 
brightening everything around them, but can be closer akin to flashlights, 
shining light only where directed. 
1. Rules Apply . . . Except When they Don’t Apply 
To some extent, the basic rules of Iowa statutory construction180 
provide predictable guidelines. When introducing the interpretative rules 
used in a particular opinion, these are sometimes described as “well 
established” or the like.181 The rub comes when a rule that has often been 
 
 179.  The view of statutory interpretation as art, rather than science, has a long 
history. See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 167 (1909) 
(“The dependence of the statutes upon the will of the judges for their effect is indicated 
by the expression often used, that interpretation is an art and not a science . . . .”). Today, 
that is presented as the consensus view. UNIF. STATUTE AND RULE CONSTR. ACT § 18 
cmt. (1995), 14 U.L.A. 499 (2005) (“Most writers would probably agree that there is a 
consensus that statutory construction is an art and not a science, but that the construer 
should conscientiously seek the legislature’s view and not the construer’s view.”). It has 
been articulated repeatedly. E.g., Robert John Araujo, Statutory Making and 
Interpretation: The Lessons of 1533–35 for the Present Age, 83 MISS. L.J. 543, 543 (2014); 
Ron Beal, The Art of Statutory Construction: Texas Style, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 339, 343 
(2012); see also Jonathan Uffelman, Caliban’s “Grace”: A Statutory Interpretation of 
Shakespeare’s Monster, 23 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 69, 122 (2013) (criticizing 
the view that statutory interpretation is a science). But see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER 
OF INTERPRETATION 14–15 (1997) (referencing “the science of statutory 
interpretation”); Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: 
Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 753, 778–79 (2013) (calling the art-
not-science view romanticized). 
 180.  See supra Part III. 
 181.  E.g., State v. Adams, 810 N.W.2d 365, 376–77 (Iowa 2012) (“Application of our 
well-settled principles of statutory interpretation . . . .” (emphasis added)); Renda v. Iowa 
Civil Rights Comm’n, 784 N.W.2d 8, 15 (Iowa 2010) (“When interpreting statutory 
provisions, we utilize our well-established rules of statutory construction.” (emphasis 
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utilized is not applied in a particular case.182 The court has noted, 
“Importantly, the rules of interpretation established to assist courts in 
determining legislative intent do not follow a common path, only a common 
outcome.”183 Yet the outcome often does, in fact, depend on what 
interpretive rules are employed. As has long been observed, “[T]he weapon 
of interpretation is a powerful one and vastly different results may be 
achieved by the substitution of one method of interpretation for another.”184 
The Iowa Supreme Court’s felony–murder decision in State v. 
Heemstra185 provides a good example of this difference. In Heemstra, the 
court overruled a series of prior cases and held that “if the act causing willful 
injury is the same act that causes the victim’s death, the former is merged 
into the murder and therefore cannot serve as the predicate felony for 
felony-murder purposes.”186 In so doing, the court chose not to apply—nor 
even directly acknowledge—two of its own rules of statutory 
interpretation.187 
First, the court sidestepped a discussion of legislative acquiescence.188 
According to this study, there have been 17 times in 10 years where the court 
has indicated that when the legislature does not enact legislation in response 
 
added)); Lange v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 710 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa 2006) (“Our rules 
for interpreting statutes are well established.” (emphasis added)).  
 182.  Compare Mall Real Estate, L.L.C. v. City of Hamburg, 818 N.W.2d 190, 199 
(Iowa 2012) (opting not to apply the canon noscitur a sociis, wherein the meaning of a 
term is ascribed in relation to associated words, because its application “would lead to 
an absurd result that would thwart the legislative intent”), with id. at 201–02 (Cady, C.J., 
dissenting) (arguing it makes sense to apply the noscitur a sociis doctrine and that its 
application would lead to a result different than that of the majority opinion, and the 
majority’s “conclusion not only defies common sense, it defies our accepted rules of 
construction”). 
 183.  Ackelson v. Manley Toy Direct, L.L.C., 832 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Iowa 2013). 
 184.  Editorial Note, Genuine and Spurious Interpretation, 12 IOWA L. REV. 276, 276 
(1927). 
 185.  State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa 2006). 
 186.  Id. at 558. 
 187.  See id. (declining to establish there was any legislative “intent to abolish the 
principle of merger” and acknowledging that the court “should not defer to the 
legislature for a signal for [it] to adopt a legal principle that is the responsibility of the 
court and within the power of the court to apply”). Arguably, it ignored more than two 
rules. The dissent believed it also ignored one of the more important rules, “the plain 
meaning of the controlling statutes.” Id. at 563 (Carter, J., dissenting). 
 188.  See id. at 558. But see supra text accompanying note 98 (explaining how the 
court may cite legislative acquiescence as evidence of intent). 
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to court opinions in an area of law, this inaction serves as an endorsement of 
the court’s application of the law.189 This inaction typically speaks for itself 
without the court referencing any specific indication that the legislature 
considered the issue and chose not to respond.190 In Heemstra, however, the 
court took another tack.191 Although its prior decisions (dating back to 1982) 
were discussed at length, they were not discussed in the context of legislative 
acquiescence.192 In fact, legislative silence here indicates that the legislature 
simply has never considered the matter: 
It is argued in this case that, 
[a]lthough the reasoning of those courts and commentators 
that reject the use of felonious assaults as crimes for which felony 
murder may be established is based on sound policy 
considerations, those considerations have been rejected by [the 
Iowa] legislature. As a result, this court is not free to invoke those 
considerations no matter how valid we find them to be. 
This is simply not true. The legislature has never considered the issue of 
whether, when the act causing willful injury is the same as that causing 
death, the two acts should be deemed merged.193 
The court later underscored the point: 
Although the State argues that merger principles should not apply to 
these facts, nothing in any of the statutes relied upon to support that 
argument suggests that the legislature had any intent to abolish the 
principle of merger under the circumstances of this case. Furthermore, 
we should not defer to the legislature for a signal for us to adopt a legal 
principle that is the responsibility of the court and within the power of 
the court to apply, based on legal precedent, common sense, and 
 
 189.  See supra, Table 2. 
 190.  See, e.g., State v. Ross, 729 N.W.2d 806, 811 (Iowa 2007). Ross provides a typical 
illustration of how legislative acquiescence is presented:  
Moreover, in 1992 this court held . . . that the mandatory minimum sentence of 
section 902.11 trumped the mandatory minimum sentence of section 902.8. The 
legislature has taken no action in the fourteen years since that decision to correct 
our interpretation of these statutes, if indeed that interpretation was wrong.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
 191.  See Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d at 557–58. 
 192.  See generally id. at 555–58. 
 193.  Id. at 557 (alterations in original). 
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fairness.194 
While the majority opinion made no note of legislative acquiescence, the 
dissent presents it as one of the reasons past precedent should not have been 
overturned: 
 Although the reasoning of those courts and commentators that 
reject the use of felonious assaults as crimes for which felony murder 
may be established is based on sound policy considerations, those 
considerations have been rejected by our legislature. As a result, this 
court is not free to invoke those considerations no matter how valid we 
find them to be. As the majority has noted, this court has stood strong 
on this issue in the years following Beeman, and we have reaffirmed that 
decision on no less than four occasions. This chain of authority presents 
yet another reason why the result reached in Beeman should not now be 
altered. We have recognized that stare decisis is particularly applicable 
“where the construction placed on a statute by previous decisions has 
been long acquiesced in by the legislature, by its continued use or failure 
to change the language of the statute so construed, the power to change 
the law as interpreted being regarded, in such circumstances, as one to 
be exercised solely by the legislature.” That principle of law has been 
previously invoked by this court in our consideration of the Beeman line 
of cases. 195 
Even if the court found reason to overturn precedent, directly 
acknowledging the legislative acquiescence argument would have helped 
formulate a more nuanced understanding of Iowa statutory interpretation 
principles. Other cases have contributed in this way. For instance, in a case 
decided the year before Heemstra, the court overruled Smith v. ADM Feed 
Corp.196 by granting a jury trial under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA).197 
The decision explicitly acknowledged the limits of legislative acquiescence 
arguments: 
As for the legislative-assent-from-silence argument, it should be noted 
that the majority in Smith ignored this very principle. The dissent in 
Smith correctly noted that in several cases before that case was decided 
claimants were afforded a jury trial under the ICRA. Indeed, historically 
 
 194.  Id. at 558. 
 195.  Id. at 566 (Carter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Cover v. Craemer, 
137 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Iowa 1965)). 
 196.  Smith v. ADM Feed Corp., 456 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 1990). 
 197.  McElroy v. State, 703 N.W.2d 385, 395 (Iowa 2005). 
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Iowans were afforded the right to a jury trial under previous civil rights 
statutes. Rather than attempt to divine legislative intent in this fashion, 
we must remember that legislation sometimes persists on account of 
“inattention and default rather than by any conscious and collective 
decision.”198 
In another case, decided two years after Heemstra, the court departed from 
its prior interpretation of the medical malpractice statute of limitations but 
explained why it was not deferring to legislative acquiescence: 
 This case requires us once again to visit the medical malpractice 
statute of limitations and apply it to the facts of a particular case. We 
have done this on a number of occasions since the special statute was 
enacted in 1975, and have developed a body of interpretative law in the 
process. Yet, this law has raised some questions about the fairness of the 
outcome of a number of these cases. This perception has not gone 
unnoticed by us, for we have freely acknowledged the statute can 
“severely restrict[] the rights of unsuspecting patients.” Nevertheless, 
we have declined to change course, recognizing it is the role of the 
legislature to “address this problem.” 
 It is, of course, the role of the legislature to write statutes, and it is 
our role to interpret them based on their application in the course of 
litigation. Moreover, the legislature can rewrite a statute to reflect its 
intent when it does not believe our interpretation in a particular case 
has accomplished this goal. Yet, these general principles of separation 
of powers and fundamental duties do not totally absolve us from our 
continued responsibility to interpret applicable statutes in each case 
and, more importantly, to revisit our past interpretations if we are 
convinced they have not clearly captured the intent of our legislature. 
We adhere to precedent, but also remain committed to clarifying the 
law as we work with our precedent. When our interpretation of a statute 
has created problems in the application of the statute to subsequent 
cases, we should be willing to reexamine our precedent to see if our 
understanding of the legislative intent can be better articulated.199 
Although that explanation may leave the application of legislative 
acquiescence murky, it at least acknowledged that the principle exists and 
helps frame its limitations. 
 
 198.  Id. (citations omitted) (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 319 (1986)). 
 199.  Rathje v. Mercy Hosp., 745 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Iowa 2008) (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Schlote v. Dawson, 676 N.W.2d 187, 194 (Iowa 2004)).  
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A second principle that the Heemstra court ignored is the presumption 
that the legislature is aware of the state of the law when it enacts a statute.200 
In adopting the merger limitation, the court confirmed one scholar’s analysis 
that its prior application of the felony–murder doctrine risked creating “an 
ever-expanding felony murder rule.”201 As another commentator noted, this 
“fear of expansion, however, ultimately stems not from the structure of 
Iowa’s felony-murder doctrine, but from the belief that the Iowa Legislature 
carelessly will label certain crimes felonious assaults without realizing the 
potential felony-murder implications.”202 
Again, it is only the dissent that articulated the rule that the legislature 
is presumed to know the state of the law when it enacts a statute: 
 After considering the merger doctrine as approved in other 
jurisdictions, the court stated in Beeman: 
We conclude that the inclusion, by the legislature, of “felonious 
assault” in sections 707.2(2) and 702.11, indicates that it intended 
that felonious assaults, including willful injury under section 708.4, 
be felonies that may serve as the basis of a felony-murder and that 
the merger doctrine discussed in Hinkle not apply to such assaults. 
This result was compelled by the unambiguous wording of the 
controlling statutes and the long-standing judicial recognition that the 
legislature is aware of the meaning of all related statutory provisions and 
does not enact inconsistent provisions without expressly recognizing the 
inconsistency. In the present situation, the legislature is presumed to 
have knowledge of those offenses constituting forcible felonies when it 
used the unqualified term “forcible felony” in the enactment of the 
felony-murder provision. The idea that in including willful injury among 
those offenses giving rise to felony murder the legislature had in mind a 
compartmentalization of assaultive conduct with the conclusion of an 
earlier assault prior to the act that does the victim in is absurd.203 
 
 200.  See, e.g., In re Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Iowa 2011) (quoting State v. Jones, 
298 N.W.2d 296, 298 (Iowa 1980)). 
 201.  See Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d at 558 (quoting 4 ROBERT R. RIGG, IOWA PRACTICE 
CRIMINAL LAW (I) § 3:16 (2006)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 202.  Douglas Van Zanten, Note, Felony Murder, the Merger Limitation, and 
Legislative Intent in State v. Heemstra: Deciphering the Proper Role of the Iowa Supreme 
Court in Interpreting Iowa’s Felony-Murder Statute, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1565, 1577 (2008). 
 203.  Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d at 565 (Carter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) 
(quoting State v. Beeman 315 N.W.2d 770, 777 (Iowa 1982)). 
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Although the chief argument in the dissent is that a plain language 
reading of the statutes demands the court follow precedent, the dissent also 
relied on legislative history, as documented through contemporaneous 
commentary, to support its argument.204 It noted the legislature rejected a 
proposed limitation “providing that homicide and assaults would not be a 
basis for felony murder.”205 
Predictable rules of interpretation help the legislature create law that 
will be interpreted as intended. They also help anyone trying to read and 
follow the law understand its meaning. Every interpretive rule will not apply 
to every situation, but when rules reasonably seem relevant, their existence 
should at least be noted and their application (or determined inapplicability) 
be discussed. 
2. Evidence of Intent, Including Legislative History, Can Support More than 
One Position 
The idea that evidence can be used to support more than one position 
likely seems unsurprising. It bears further consideration, though, in the 
context of statutory interpretation where the court is searching for legislative 
intent.206 When legislative intent is uncertain from the language of the statute 
and the court seeks clarification in legislative history, that history might not 
be conclusive either. For instance, in Iowa Dental Ass’n v. Iowa Insurance 
Division, the court detailed a bill’s207 enactment path, noting, 
 It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from this legislative 
history. One might infer that Senator Warnstadt’s amendment was 
 
 204.  Id. (Carter, J., dissenting). 
 205.  Id. (Carter, J., dissenting) (citing John J. Yeager, Crimes Against the Person: 
Homicide, Assault, Sexual Abuse and Kidnapping in the Proposed Iowa Criminal Code, 
60 IOWA L. REV. 503, 510–11 (1975)). 
 206.  The question of whether legislative intent exists and can be discerned has 
frequently appeared in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory 
of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 80–90 
(2012); M.B.W. Sinclair, Statutory Reasoning, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 299, 305–334 (1997); 
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward A Fact-
Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1341–44 (1990). The 
preeminent treatise on statutory construction says the debate is settled with legislative 
intent being a widely accepted construct. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 18, § 45:6, at 44 
(noting the “nonsubjective concept of ‘legislative intent’ has become a standard of 
judgment in statutory interpretation”). 
 207.  H.F. 2229, 83d Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Iowa 2010). 
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intended to accomplish something different from Senator McCoy’s, or 
that it was just viewed as a better way of saying the same thing. One 
might infer that Representative Quirk’s amendment would have altered 
the meaning of the statute. In this respect, it would have resembled 
several other amendments that were offered at the same time, that 
presumably were not supported by the dentists, and that were also 
withdrawn . . . . Or, one might infer that Representative Quirk’s 
amendment was withdrawn because it was viewed as unnecessary 
(unlike those other amendments).208 
In other cases, the justices draw on historical sources to reach different 
conclusions. One special concurrence colorfully describes the majority 
opinion’s use of legislative history: “My colleagues try to make some hay out 
of the legislative history, but their bales are meager.”209 Turning from 
figurative to literal hay, the case Sallee v. Stewart nicely exemplifies opposing 
uses of historical sources.210 
In that case, Kimberly Ann Sallee, a kindergarten field trip chaperone, 
sued the owners of a dairy farm for negligence after she fell through a hay 
drop—a hole in the hayloft floor—covered with a bale of hay and broke her 
wrist and leg.211 The children had been allowed into the loft to play under 
Sallee’s supervision.212 The Iowa Supreme Court ruled Iowa’s recreational 
use statute, Iowa Code Chapter 461C, did not apply “because the chaperone 
was not engaged in a recreational purpose within the scope of the statute.”213 
Both the majority and dissenting opinions considered the history of the 
statute in some detail, particularly the changes from the model legislation 
the legislature made when first enacting the law and the history of how the 
statute had been amended in the intervening years.214 Although these same 
sources are used in both opinions, the justices reached opposite conclusions 
about their appropriate application.215 
 
 208.  Iowa Dental Ass’n v. Iowa Ins. Div., 831 N.W.2d 138, 147 n.3 (Iowa 2013). 
 209.  State v. Jones, 817 N.W.2d 11, 26 (Iowa 2012) (Mansfield, J., concurring 
specially) (proceeding to present additional provisions enacted at the same time as the 
statute in question as evidence of legislative intent). 
 210.  Compare Sallee v. Stewart, 827 N.W.2d 128, 149–50 (Iowa 2013) with id. at 158–
64 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
 211.  Id. at 130–32. 
 212.  Id. at 131. 
 213.  Id.  
 214.  See id. at 133–42, 149–50; id. at 158–64 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
 215.  Compare id. at 131, with id. at 162. Note this discussion only focuses on the issue 
when legislative history was at play: whether Sallee was engaged in a recreational use 
  
2015] Does the Past Predict the Future? 281 
 
The majority opinion provides a five-page description of the historical 
development of recreational use statutes in the United States, noting that 
these statutes “limit the liability of landowners whose lands are used for 
recreational purposes such as hunting, fishing and sightseeing.”216 This 
historical discussion describes two different recreational use model acts: one 
developed in 1965 and the other in 1979.217 The opinion then reviews other 
states’ recreational use statutes, organizing their definitions of “recreational 
purpose” into four categories: those based on the 1965 model act; those 
based on the 1979 model act; those that combine elements from both model 
acts; and those that follow neither, instead adopting a very limited definition 
of recreational purpose.218 
Against this rather extensive historical background, the court then 
looks at the Iowa statute, noting it was based on the 1965 model act with the 
same title and substantially the same text.219 It also notes the purpose of the 
statute by discussing the bill explanation, which noted “a need to encourage 
private landowners to make their lands available by defining any potential 
liability.”220 The court then considers amendments passed before the Bill was 
enacted that caused the definition of recreational purpose to deviate from 
the 1965 model act.221 
The opinion continues, discussing the history of amendments to the 
Code section and noting that although the legislature has modified its 
definition of recreational purpose over the years to add specific qualifying 
activities, it never opted to adopt any of the more expansive choices followed 
by other jurisdictions—the “includes, but is not limited to” clause from the 
1965 model act, the kind of “catch-all provision” found in several other 
states, or the broader definition in the 1979 model act.222 Because the 
definition instead uses the phrase “means the following or any combination 
thereof,”223 the court noted, “[T]he Iowa legislature created a closed universe 
 
under the statute.  
 216.  Id. at 134 (quoting Comment, Wisconsin’s Recreational Use Statute, 66 MARQ. 
L. REV. 312, 315 (1983)); see generally id. at 133–38. 
 217.  Id. at 135–37. 
 218.  Id. at 138–41. 
 219.  Id. at 141. 
 220.  Id. (citing H.F. 151, 62d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., Explanation (Iowa 1967)). 
 221.  Id. at 141–42. 
 222.  Id. at 142. 
 223.  Id. (quoting IOWA CODE § 461C.2(5) (2009)) (internal quotation mark 
omitted).  
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of outdoor activities that trigger the protections of the statute.”224 
At the time of the case, Iowa Code Section 461C.2(5) read, 
 5. “Recreational purpose” means the following or any combination 
thereof: Hunting, trapping, horseback riding, fishing, swimming, 
boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, motorcycling, all-
terrain vehicle riding, nature study, water skiing, snowmobiling, other 
summer and winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical, 
archaeological, scenic, or scientific sites while going to and from or 
actually engaged therein.225 
After analyzing related case law,226 the court affirmed the statute’s 
ambiguity and the appropriateness of employing extrinsic aids in its 
construction.227 This process began by noting that both the Iowa statute and 
the 1965 model act have the stated purpose of “giv[ing] the public more 
recreational opportunities.”228 The court found that “[t]here can be no 
question that the evil sought to be addressed by recreational use statutes is 
the inadequacy of resources for outdoor recreation.”229 The court found 
support for this proposition in “[t]he history of the development of 
recreational use statutes, the express language of the [Outdoor Recreation 
Resources Review Commission] Report, the 1965 model act, and the 1979 
proposed model act.”230 The court also found, 
The list of recreational uses strongly suggests that the statute is designed 
to protect activities traditionally undertaken outdoors. While the statute 
recognizes that recreational use immunity may apply to appurtenant 
structures, such immunity for injuries that occur in structures is only 
applicable when the structure itself is part of or incidental to the 
underlying recreational use. Indeed, although there are hundreds of 
cases involving recreational use immunity, almost none of them occur 
within structures. For those that do, the user was actually engaged in the 
recreational purpose while inside the structure.231 
 
 224.  Id.  
 225.  § 461C.2(5) (2013). 
 226.  Sallee, 827 N.W.2d at 147–48. 
 227.  See id. at 149. 
 228.  Id.  
 229.  Id. at 149–50. 
 230.  Id. at 150. 
 231.  Id. 
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Additional support for a limited application of the statute came from 
“the fact that the legislature ha[d] not adopted expansive language in its 
recreational purpose section.”232 The court held that although a more 
expansive definition “might be supported by policy reasons, any such action 
must be taken by the legislature, not by” the court.233 Taken together, this 
evidence led the court to “conclude that the best interpretation of Iowa’s 
recreational use statute is that the closed universe of activities specifically 
listed in [the statute] must be interpreted in a fashion consistent with 
promoting true outdoor activity.”234 
With the interpretive framework in place, the court applied the law to 
the facts of the case, finding that the court should focus on the activity 
precipitating the injury235 and that “frolicking in a hayloft”236 fit neither the 
specifically articulated recreational purposes nor the more general phrase in 
the definition “other summer sports.”237 A broader interpretation of that 
phrase would render the listed activities meaningless.238 The court 
evocatively stated, “We cannot convert the phrase ‘other summer sports’ 
into a statutory PAC-MAN that goes backward to gobble up preexisting 
statutory limitations and then goes forward to consume subsequent 
legislative language.”239 The court noted that the drafting history, wherein 
the legislature amended the original definition from the 1965 model act, and 
the subsequent history of amendments to the Code section, wherein the 
legislature did not adopt the more expansive definition from the 1979 model 
act, also dispel a broader reading of “other summer sports.”240 The court 
concluded that the recreational use statute did not apply because Sallee’s 
injuries were not incurred while engaged in a recreational purpose, as 
required by statute.241 
 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  See id. at 150–51. 
 236.  Id. at 151. 
 237.  Id. at 152–53 (internal quotation marks omitted). Note that the court applies 
the statutory construction rule ejusdem generis to determine that since “other summer 
sports” comes at the end of a list of specific activities, the phrase only encapsulates other 
activities similar in character to those listed. Id. at 153. 
 238.  Id.  
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id. 
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The dissent, on the other hand, found that the recreational use statute 
should limit farm owners’ liability.242 Among other rationale, the dissent 
supported its argument by using Code section history and comparing the 
Iowa statute, as adopted, to the 1965 model act.243 The dissent purposely 
limited the majority opinion’s broad consideration of the history of 
recreational use statutes in general and in other states to focus on the 
evolution of Iowa’s statute.244 Quoting from the original act, the dissent 
noted the definition of “land” included both agricultural lands and 
“‘buildings, structures and machinery or equipment’ that were ‘appurtenant 
thereto,’ such as a barn.”245 Next, the dissent noted the definition of 
“recreational purpose” was expanded twice in 1971.246 The first change 
added “horseback riding” to the recreational purposes list.247 The second 
added both “motorcycling” and “snowmobiling,” while also changing 
“winter sports” to “other summer and winter sports.”248 
The dissent noted, “Although we do not have helpful legislative history 
for the second 1971 amendment, it seems logical to conclude that the 
legislature wanted to obviate the need for future piecemeal amendments by 
including some kind of a catchall—other summer and winter sports.”249 Thus, 
whereas the majority opinion looked at the history of changes to the 
recreational purpose definition and found evidence the legislature did not 
intend to adopt one of the three broader models of that definition, the 
dissent found the legislature did, in fact, follow the catch-all provision 
path.250 
The dissent also rebuffed the majority’s emphasis on outdoor 
recreation, commenting, “The statute nowhere requires an outdoor use, and 
indeed the reference to buildings is inconsistent with such a restriction.”251 
The dissent also drew upon the way the legislature changed the definition of 
 
 242.  See id. at 157–58 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
 243.  Id. at 158–61 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
 244.  See id. at 158–59 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
 245.  Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (quoting 1967 Iowa Acts ch. 149, § 2). 
 246.  See id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
 247.  Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (quoting 1971 Iowa Acts ch. 129, § 1) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 248.  Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (quoting 1971 Iowa Acts ch. 130, § 1) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 249.  Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
 250.  See id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
 251.  Id. at 159 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
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land from the one in the 1965 model act and instead emphasized agricultural 
use.252 Further, the dissent argued Sallee’s activities fit under the “other 
summer and winter sports” clause of the recreational purpose definition, 
noting that this language was inserted by the same amendment that “added 
‘motorcycling’ and ‘snowmobiling’ to the list of covered activities.”253 This is 
seen as indicative of legislative intent to define “sports” broadly: 
In short, I conclude the legislature intended in 1971 to introduce some 
flexibility into the definition of “recreational purpose” that other states 
(which used the model act language) already had. In short, while our 
general assembly had elected not to use the model act’s broader 
phrasing—”includes, but is not limited to”—in 1967, it nonetheless 
opened up the definition of “recreational purpose” in 1971 by making 
clear that other summer and winter sports would be covered.254 
As to the PAC-MAN argument—that such a broad definition would 
render listing specific activities meaningless, and the legislature certainly 
would not have added more specific activities later255—the dissent suggested 
the majority’s definition of sports would be subject to the same criticism and 
stated, “I think we should acknowledge the reality that groups often go to 
the legislature seeking a specific statutory immunity even when a more 
general immunity already protects them.”256 
“Under a dictionary definition where ‘sport’ means ‘a source of 
diversion: RECREATION’ and ‘physical activity engaged in for pleasure,’ 
jumping in a hayloft clearly qualifies as a sport.”257 Moreover, the dissent 
found that although “[f]rolicking in hay can be and frequently is an outdoor 
sport,” it does not have to be an outdoor activity to be covered.258 “[T]he 
legislature did not say that sports would only be covered when played 
outdoors,” and including buildings in the definition of land “would not have 
made sense if the legislature did not mean some indoor activities to be 
covered by the statute.”259 The dissent also concluded that Sallee did not 
 
 252.  Id. at 159–60 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 253.  Id. at 162 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (citing 1971 Iowa Acts 244). 
 254.  Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
 255.  See supra text accompanying note 239. 
 256.  Sallee, 827 N.W.2d at 162 n.13 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
 257.  Id. at 163 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (quoting MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1134 (10th ed. 2002)). 
 258.  See id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
 259.  Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
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have to be playing in the hay herself to trigger the statute; it was sufficient 
that she was there to support a recreational purpose.260 
The Sallee opinion was released on February 15, 2013,261 and the 
legislature wasted no time responding. That same legislative session it 
amended Chapter 461C, the statute at issue in that case.262 Among other 
provisions, the Act expanded both the purpose statement and the definition 
of recreational purpose.263 It added the following language to Iowa Code 
Section 461C.1: “The provisions of this chapter shall be construed liberally 
and broadly in favor of private holders of land to accomplish the purposes 
of this chapter.”264 In Iowa Code Section 461C.2(5), the recreational purpose 
definition, the legislature added “educational activities” to the listed 
activities.265 The legislature also added the following: 
“Recreational purpose” includes the activity of accompanying another 
person who is engaging in such activities. “Recreational purpose” is not 
limited to active engagement in such activities, but includes entry onto, 
use of, passage over, and presence on any part of the land in connection 
with or during the course of such activities.266 
Lest there be any doubt the legislation was adopted in response to the 
Sallee decision, the bill explanation267 puts a fine point on it: “The bill relates 
to the recent decision rendered by the Iowa Supreme Court in Sallee v. 
Stewart, (No. 11-0892) (Iowa 2013).”268 Although the legislature expanded 
the definition of recreational purpose, it still left it somewhat limited, opting 
not to change the phrase “means the following or any combination 
thereof.”269 
Sallee provides a particularly good example of the limitations of simply 
 
 260.  Id. at 164 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
 261.  Id. at 128. 
 262.  See Act of June 17, 2013, 2013 Iowa Acts ch. 128. 
 263.  See id. §§ 1, 2(5). 
 264.  Id. § 1. 
 265.  Id. § 3(5). 
 266.  Id.  
 267.  Note that the bill was not amended before enactment. See B. History for H.F. 
649, IOWA LEGISLATURE, http://coolice.legis.iowa.gov/Cool-ICE/default.asp?Category= 
BillInfo&Service=DspHistory&var=HF&key=0708C&GA=85 (last visited Nov. 12, 
2014). 
 268.  Iowa H.F. 649, at Explanation. 
 269.  See Act of June 17, 2013, 2013 Iowa Acts ch. 128, § 2(5). 
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knowing which historical sources the court may consider when interpreting 
a statute. Even though both the majority and dissent looked at the 1965 
model act, Iowa’s original enactment of its recreational use statute, and 
changes over time to the definition of recreational purpose, this evidence 
leads to different conclusions. 
B. The Art of Reading an Iowa Statute 
As the above discussion of the Heemstra and Sallee cases illustrates, 
although statutory interpretation may draw on established rules, their 
application is not rigid, and results may vary.270 Legislative intent is inferred 
from a great variety of tools.271 Those who understand as many of these tools 
as possible will be best positioned to comprehend and apply a statute. When 
there is more than one reasonable construction of a statute, an 
understanding of the tools of statutory construction can help build the 
strongest possible case to support a particular reading. 
To that end, the following questions may be helpful to consider when 
confronting an ambiguous statute.272 
1. Carefully Consider the Language of the Statute and its Context 
 Is every word in the statute being construed to have meaning? 
Where does the ambiguity arise? Is there more than one reasonable 
interpretation based on either specific language used or the provision 
considered within the context of the entire statute or related statutes, or does 
a literal interpretation lead to absurd results counter to the statute’s 
purpose? 
 What is the statute’s context? Where is it placed in the code? Does it 
explicitly reference any other statutes? Are there relevant definitions, 
statements of purpose, or legislative findings that apply to the title, subtitle, 
or chapter? Do other code sections use similar language? If so, do these 
similar statutes contain words or provisions omitted by the statute in 
question? 
 Are there definitions or rules in the construction rules273 that might 
apply? 
 
 270.  See supra Part V.A.1–2. 
 271.  See supra Part III. 
 272.  Of course, related regulations and case law must also be read for a complete 
understanding of the statute. 
 273.  IOWA CODE §§ 4.1–.14 (2013). 
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2. Check Code History 
 How has the statute evolved over time? If there was a significant 
change in the code section at some point, does all past case law still apply, or 
did some prior cases construe the statute in a substantially different form? If 
the provision has long been unmodified, is that likely to be considered 
evidence of legislative acquiescence to interpretive court opinions? 
How did the entire act adding or modifying the statute read? What was 
its overall intent? 
What was its title and summary? How was it presented in the LSA 
Summary of Legislation? 
3. Check Legislative History 
Is the Iowa law based on another law? If so, are there relevant drafters’ 
comments, commentary, or interpretive cases to consult? How was the Iowa 
statute modified from the model before its adoption? 
What can be learned from the bill file where the relevant provision was 
added? What was the bill title? What does the explanation say? Was the bill 
amended after being introduced? Did any proposed amendments fail? Were 
there prior or related versions of the bill from the same or an earlier General 
Assembly? Were any fiscal notes attached? 
4. Check for Persuasive and Secondary Authority 
If other states have similar statutes, what do they say, and how have 
they been construed? 
Was contemporaneous commentary published? Have any secondary 
sources considered the statute? 
5. When Does the Court Use Historical Sources? 
In addition to reading the statute and its associated history as 
thoroughly as possible, it also helps to have an idea of the circumstances 
under which the court has considered historical sources in the past.274 As this 
 
 274.  This study did not trace arguments into the briefs to identify when and how the 
parties cited historical sources in support of their positions. While the court sometimes 
may consider historical sources primarily to address arguments raised in briefs, it is 
possible that at other times the court, of its own accord, opts to review historical 
materials to better understand the statute. 
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study shows, using historical sources is an important instrument in the 
statutory construction tool kit. More than one-third of the cases in the 
statutory interpretation data set cited historical sources as part of the 
analysis.275 Moreover, the consideration of history tends to be important. In 
just more than two-thirds of those cases providing historical analysis, that 
discussion either influenced the interpretation or supported one 
interpretation over another.276 
Even narrowing the historical sources considered to legislative history 
leaves a fair number of cases, with just more than 17 percent of the statutory 
interpretation data set looking at either Iowa or model act legislative history 
and almost 11 percent looking at Iowa legislative history.277 Thus, it would 
be foolish to assume that no relevant legislative history exists for an 
ambiguous statute or to gamble that because recorded Iowa legislative 
history is rather sparse, it can simply be ignored. Savvy researchers will know 
when the courts might use legislative history and how to find it. 
This study notes the number of times when the court used legislative 
history from 2004–2013.278 However, it is difficult to say whether there were 
other times it might have consulted legislative history, but either did not look 
for it or searched fruitlessly without acknowledging the unsuccessful search 
in the opinion. There is some evidence, though, that historical sources could 
have been cited more often than they actually were. For instance, one 
commentator discussing State v. Isaac279 noted that although neither the 
majority opinion nor the dissent used legislative history, “that history is 
instructive.”280 To the extent that Iowa legislative history has been perceived 
as nonexistent,281 attorneys may not seek it and bring it to the court’s 
attention as often as they could. In addition, the court’s openness to citing a 
 
 275.  See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 276.  See supra Table 2. Although the table references total statutes construed rather 
than total court cases, these numbers are almost identical. See supra note 156. 
 277.  See supra Table 2. 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  State v. Isaac, 756 N.W.2d 817 (Iowa 2008). 
 280.  Michael C. Dorf, What the Iowa Supreme Court’s Recent Public Indecency 
Decision Reveals About Statutory Interpretation, FINDLAW (Sept. 10, 2008), http://writ. 
news.findlaw.com/dorf/20080910.html. Note, however, that Dorf’s discussion of the 
history of Iowa Code § 709.9, which he calls legislative history, would be defined by this 
Article as code history. 
 281.  See MCCONNELL, supra note 1. 
  
290 Drake Law Review [Vol. 63 
 
variety of historical sources282 combined with technological advances 
providing new sources of recorded legislative history may increase the future 
rate of citation to Iowa legislative history. 
a. Legislative History. The statute authorizing the courts to look at 
legislative history to determine legislative intent is conditional, noting this is 
an option “[i]f a statute is ambiguous.”283 Case law offers the same 
conditions,284 often noting that no statutory construction will occur at all 
unless a statute is ambiguous.285 Ambiguity may arise in more than one way, 
from the obvious issue of legitimate doubt as to a statute’s meaning to the 
perhaps less apparent qualification of a literal interpretation leading to 
absurd results.286 
The court has established, “A statute is ambiguous if reasonable minds 
could differ or be uncertain as to the meaning of the statute.”287 It is, 
however, not sufficient for the two parties to present different versions of a 
statute’s meaning for the court to consider it ambiguous.288 For instance, in 
State v. Finders, the court interpreted the then-current grandfather provision 
of Iowa Code Section 692A.2A(4)(c),289 which exempted those who were 
convicted of sexual offenses against a minor and who had established their 
 
 282.  See supra note 162 and accompanying text; see also supra Table 2. 
 283.  IOWA CODE § 4.6 (2013). 
 284.  E.g., Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. 
Mobil Oil Corp., 606 N.W.2d 359, 365 (Iowa 2000) (citing State v. McSorley, 549 N.W.2d 
807, 809 (Iowa 1996)) (“Legislative history is properly considered in interpreting 
statutory language found to be ambiguous.”). 
 285.  E.g., State v. McCullah, 787 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Iowa 2010) (citing Carolan v. Hill, 
553 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1996)) (“If, as the State contends, the statute is unambiguous, 
we will not engage in statutory construction.”); Rolfe State Bank v. Gunderson, 794 
N.W.2d 561, 564 (Iowa 2011) (citing State v. Tesch, 704 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Iowa 2005)) 
(“Before engaging in statutory construction, we examine whether the language of the 
statute is ambiguous.”). 
 286.  See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
 287.  Carolan, 553 N.W.2d at 887 (citing Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 
537 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa 1995)). 
 288.  This may be similar to the contract interpretation rule that “a mere 
disagreement between the parties regarding the meaning of undefined terms does not 
automatically establish an ambiguity.” LeMars Mut. Ins. Co. v. Joffer, 574 N.W.2d 303, 
307 (Iowa 1998) (citing A.Y. McDonald v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 619 (Iowa 
1991)). 
 289.  This Code section was repealed by Act of May 21, 2009, ch. 119 § 31, 2009 Iowa 
Acts 411, 430. 
  
2015] Does the Past Predict the Future? 291 
 
residence prior to July 1, 2002, from the statutory prohibition against 
residing within 2,000 feet of a school or child care facility.290 The decision 
notes, “Both parties contend the grandfather provision, section 
692A.2A(4)(c), is ambiguous,” explaining that Finders’s interpretation 
emphasizes the word “person” rather than “residence,” and the State’s 
reading means that the exemption is lost when the residence changes.291 The 
court wrote, “While the grandfather provision is not a model of clarity, we 
do not find it ambiguous.”292 The court proceeded to explain its agreement 
with the State’s interpretation.293 
Even when the statute is not ambiguous, the court sometimes looks at 
legislative history to support its plain language interpretation. For instance, 
one case states that an amended version of a Code section is clear on its face, 
but continues to quote from the bill explanation, noting, “This interpretation 
is consistent with the general assembly’s explanation accompanying the 
House version of the bill.”294 
b. Code History. There is no threshold of ambiguity required before 
the court considers code history, which may partially account for its more 
frequent use. In approximately 29 percent of the statutes construed in the 
statutory interpretation data set, the court looked at code history or its 
related considerations, legislative response, or legislative acquiescence.295 
The evolution of a codified area of law can provide the background by which 
the court considers the statute and inform its interpretation of legislative 
intent. As with all statutory interpretation, the relevant statutes are 
considered in whole and in context,296 meaning this analysis can be more 
involved than simply tracing the history of a single code section. In addition, 
current code sections, their historical evolution, and legislative history data 
can become intertwined as the court examines a statute. For example, in 
State v. Fischer the court decided that an electronic form met the 
requirement in Iowa Code Section 321J.6 for a police officer to issue a 
written request before testing the blood, breath, or urine of a driver 
 
 290.  See State v. Finders, 743 N.W.2d 546, 548 (quoting IOWA CODE § 692A.2A(4)(c) 
(2007)). 
 291.  Id. at 548–49. 
 292.  Id. at 549. 
 293.  See id. 
 294.  In re Estate of Myers, 825 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2012). 
 295.  See supra Table 2. 
 296.  See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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suspected of operating while intoxicated (OWI).297 The opinion briefly looks 
at the history of Iowa’s OWI laws before turning more specifically to the 
implied consent provisions.298 The opinion notes that “the current ‘written 
request’ requirement was a part of Iowa’s original statute.”299 After 
discussing relevant case law,300 the court invoked then-current statutory 
definitions, starting with the definition of “written,” as codified in the rules 
of construction.301 According to that definition, the term may “include an 
electronic record as defined in section 554D.103.”302 The court then turned 
to the referenced section, noting “‘electronic record’ is defined as any record 
‘created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic 
means.’”303 This led the court to consult the history of Section 554D.103, 
quoting from its original statement of purpose (later repealed) and citing 
information in the fiscal note attached to that Bill.304 
Another notable use of code history involves deciding whether prior 
case law still applies. This analysis requires determining whether code 
amendments subsequent to court decisions modified the statutes in such a 
way that those earlier opinions no longer apply. For instance, in one 2013 
case, the court considered whether punitive damages could be awarded 
under the ICRA.305 In discussing the history of the ICRA, the opinion 
indicates, “[T]he statutory language at issue in this case has not been 
changed in any meaningful way since the 1978 amendments.”306 A 
supporting footnote briefly details the changes to the Code section that the 
court deemed irrelevant.307 In contrast, in a 2011 case, the court rejected a 
particular precedent as inapplicable in light of the fact that the Code sections 
it was interpreting had since been amended.308 
 
 297.  State v. Fischer, 785 N.W.2d 697, 698, 706 (Iowa 2010). 
 298.  Id. at 699–701. 
 299.  Id. at 701 (citing IOWA CODE § 321B.3 (1966)). 
 300.  See id. 
 301.  Id. at 702 (quoting § 4.1(39) (2009)). 
 302.  Id. (quoting § 4.1(39)). 
 303.  Id. (quoting § 554D.103(7)). 
 304.  Id. (quoting 2000 Iowa Acts ch. 1189, § 2) (citing H.F. 2205, 78th Gen. Assemb., 
2d Sess., Fiscal Note (Iowa 2000)). 
 305.  Ackelson v. Manley Toy Direct, L.L.C., 832 N.W.2d 678, 679 (Iowa 2013). 
 306.  Id. at 681. 
 307.  Id. at 681 n.2. 
 308.  Krupp Place 1 Co-op, Inc. v. Bd. of Review of Jasper Cnty., 801 N.W.2d 9, 15–
16 (Iowa 2011). 
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6. Finding Iowa Legislative History and Code History 
Because historical sources may affect the interpretation of a statute, 
knowing how to find them is critical. An increasing amount of information 
is now freely accessible on the Internet, from many of the source documents 
themselves to guides explaining how to find these materials.309 It would be 
foolish to replicate here the information available in an online research 
guide, partly because as availability changes, a guide, unlike this Article, can 
be updated. However, a few basic tips will help the researcher more 
effectively use a research guide as a jumping-off point. 
a. Read the Background Information on the Guides. Research guides 
may include important explanatory information as well as direct researchers 
to specific sources to search. For instance, the Drake Law Library Iowa 
Legislative History guide310 explains the basics of reading statutory history 
in both the Code of Iowa and the Iowa Code Annotated311 and also notes 
that bill explanations are found at the end of the bill as introduced, rather 
than the end of the enrolled bill.312 
b. Pay Attention to the General Assembly Number. Bill numbers are 
only sequential for both sessions of a particular General Assembly and then 
restart with the next General Assembly.313 The legislative website defaults to 
the current General Assembly but often provides the option to access older 
General Assemblies by clicking on a green down arrow at the far right of the 
gray bar indicating the General Assembly selected. Pay attention to this 
selection. When revising a search in an older General Assembly, the selected 
 
 309.  Jennifer Bryan Morgan, Government Documents Librarian at Indiana 
University Maurer School of Law, maintains State Legislative History Research Guides, 
an index to legislative history research guides for every state and the District of 
Columbia. See State Legislative History Research Guides Inventory, MAURER SCH. OF 
LAW, http://law.indiana.libguides.com/c.php?g=19813&p=112411 (last updated Nov. 30, 
2014). 
 310.  See supra note 110, at Overview. 
 311.  See id. at Step 2: Code Section History. 
 312.  See id. at Step 4: Bill Versions (Bill Book). 
 313.  Some parts of the General Assembly site provide both General Assembly 
number and year while others list only General Assembly number. In this case it might 
be useful to consult the Drake Law Library chart correlating years to General Assembly 
numbers. See Karen Wallace, Year to Iowa General Assembly Conversion Chart, DRAKE 
LAW LIBRARY, http://facstaff.law.drake.edu/karen.wallace/GAYears.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2014). 
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legislative term will often revert to the current. In addition, be aware that in 
some places, this selection tool searches the entire General Assembly, while 
in others it is session specific.314 
c. Watch for Changes in the General Assembly Site. The General 
Assembly site continues to evolve, including more information and 
enhancing the means of finding it. In addition to a wealth of quick search 
options, tables, and indexes on its site, the General Assembly page offers an 
advanced search feature. For years,315 this interface, the Advanced 
Document Search, or NXT,316 has offered reliable, albeit somewhat 
clunky,317 search access to sources including the current Code and session 
laws dating back to 1993. The State of Iowa is in the process of switching to 
a more modern interface, the Iowa Legislature Document Research, or 
SOLR, search engine.318 At least some SOLR features have been available 
to the general public since summer 2012, but other features (including the 
user guide) have been restricted to legislators and legislative staff.319 Though 
SOLR was initially released as a separate, linked site, the LSA plans to 
integrate SOLR within the General Assembly site and complete its 
migration before the 2015 legislative session.320 In both iterations, SOLR 
provides left-hand filters that allow the user to refine searches either before 
or after entering other search criteria,321 a layout similar to many current 
 
 314.  On Committees, IOWA LEGISLATURE, https://www.legis.iowa.gov/committees/ 
committees (last visited Nov. 12, 2014), compare the General Assembly selection bar 
directly under the heading “Legislative Council” (for the entire General Assembly) with 
the selection bar under the heading “Interim Study Committees” (select by General 
Assembly session). Also, note the difference with the bar under the heading “Permanent 
Statutory Committees” (select by calendar year). 
 315.  The interface was available to the public as of fall 2004. Van Engelenhoven, 
supra note 143. 
 316.  Advanced Search, IOWA LEGISLATURE, http://search.legis.state.ia.us/NXT/gate 
way.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
 317.  For instance, search forms allowed users to limit searches to a particular source 
or sources, or subset of the same. However, the user could not edit the search without 
reapplying any desired limits. 
 318.  Iowa Legislature Document Research, IOWA LEGISLATURE, https://research. 
legis.iowa.gov/search (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
 319.  Van Engelenhoven, supra note 143. 
 320.  Id. The integrated SOLR is available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/publication 
s/search. 
 321.  Filters can be added and removed to update search results, but a more robust 
ability to edit keyword search terms is still lacking in the new interface. 
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search interfaces.322 Managing these improvements is a large job, and as 
additional content is added and site design changes, linked content on the 
General Assembly site may move or disappear. When this occurs, 
researchers may have to regroup and access the content in another way. 
Fortunately, the wide variety of site search options means alternatives are 
typically available for the persistent researcher. 
d. Consider the Best Starting Point for the Research Need. The precise 
type of information needed helps determine the most efficient research 
approach.323 For instance, the court may need to consider how a code section 
read at an earlier point in time, as relevant to the litigated matters.324 In this 
case it might be easiest to start directly with the code that was current at the 
time in question rather than starting with the current code and tracing 
backward. The court may also need to consider the evolution of the subject 
matter in the code.325 This can span decades and may involve multiple code 
sections. Checking to see if a law review article or other secondary source 
has already provided this analysis can save time in the long run. If that 
approach fails, using code indexes often proves more efficient than 
conducting keyword searches. Not only are the indexes to the Iowa Code 
available in print from Iowa’s major law libraries,326 they are also available 
as part of the General Assembly’s PDF Code archive.327 The court may also 
 
 322. For instance, WestlawNext and Lexis Advance allow the user to refine searches 
both before and after entering initial search criteria. 
 323.  Note that the approaches described here are not mutually exclusive; one or 
more techniques used in tandem can often provide the most helpful information to 
ascertain the statute’s meaning. 
 324.  E.g., State v. Hutton, 796 N.W.2d 898, 902–03 (Iowa 2011) (looking to an older 
version of the Code to find the version of the relevant statute in effect when the contested 
action occurred); cf. Kolb v. City of Storm Lake, 736 N.W.2d 546, 553–54 n.6 (Iowa 2007) 
(choosing to cite to the current Code rather than one in effect at the time of the dispute 
because the only change in the Code was a renumbering of the Section). 
 325.  See, e.g., Sierra Club Iowa Chapter v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 832 N.W.2d 636, 
643–47 (Iowa 2013) (analyzing the development of Iowa Code Section 17A.9 from its 
inception using both primary and secondary sources). 
 326.  Drake University Law Library, State Law Library of Iowa, and University of 
Iowa Law Library. 
 327.  Iowa Code Archive, IOWA LEGISLATURE, https://www.legis.iowa.gov/archives/ 
shelves/code (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). For older codes where indexes are not listed 
separately, they are incorporated at the end of the code itself. The index to the Iowa 
Code Annotated is generally more detailed than the index to the official Iowa Code, 
particularly after the Code index was greatly reduced in 2013, in favor of relying on other 
  
296 Drake Law Review [Vol. 63 
 
need to look at the history of amendments to a code section, tracing the 
addition or deletion of a particular portion of a statute.328 Unless a secondary 
source has already created such a timeline, this work typically starts by using 
the information provided in the code section history.329 Once the specific 
legislation that made the relevant change is identified, any available sources 
related to its legislative history can be obtained using the act and bill 
numbers together with the associated General Assembly number and year. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE IOWA SUPREME COURT 
Most of the information in this Article attempts to illuminate, not 
change, Iowa Supreme Court practices. However, the court could easily 
implement two practices that would facilitate the legal researcher’s ability to 
find and apply rules relating to the use of legislative history when 
interpreting an Iowa statute. These suggestions follow. 
A. Consistently Cite Iowa Code Section 4.6 in Court Opinions That Use 
Iowa Legislative History 
When the legislature enacted Iowa Code Section 4.6, it was intended 
to codify the common law approach to statutory interpretation of ambiguous 
statutes.330 Thus, the statute did not preempt the common law as it would 
have if the statutes conflicted.331 Even so, it still seems surprising that when 
the court is asserting its authority to use legislative history to interpret a 
statute, it does not consistently cite the current, directly relevant statute as 
 
methods of electronic searching. General Index to the Code of Iowa, IOWA GEN. 
ASSEMB., Editor’s Notes (2013). However, older Iowa Code Annotated indexes are 
more difficult to access. In print, the title is updated by pocket parts and supplements. 
When the new annual index arrives, a law library may not save the superseded index. On 
Westlaw, the title can be searched in historical versions back to 1988, but the index access 
is only to the current version. 
 328.  See, e.g., City of Cedar Rapids v. James Props., Inc., 701 N.W.2d 673, 677–78 
(Iowa 2005) (using both Code history and legislative history related to a later change to 
the statute to help explain what the statute meant at the time relevant to the case). 
 329.  Often, the editor’s and revisor’s notes (also under the heading “historical and 
statutory notes”) of the Iowa Code Annotated might prove a more efficient starting 
point than the unannotated official Code. 
 330.  See supra notes 108–118 and accompanying text. 
 331.  2B NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 50:1, at 151–52 (7th ed., rev. 2012) (“[W]here legislation and the 
common law conflict, legislation governs because it is the latest expression of the law.”). 
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authority for that proposition.332 Yet, in the study’s 40 cases in which the 
court uses Iowa legislative history, it either specifically cites Iowa Code 
Section 4.6(3) or cites all of Iowa Code Section 4.6 six times,333 meaning that 
the Code provision is directly cited in only 15 percent of the cases to which 
it is relevant.334 
This phenomenon could represent a deliberate, philosophical choice if 
the court believed that codified rules of statutory interpretation invaded its 
constitutional authority.335 In other jurisdictions, conflicts between the 
judicial and legislative branches over who has the authority to establish rules 
of statutory interpretation have raised separation of powers arguments.336 
However, that does not seem to be what is occurring here—the question is 
not so much one of choosing whether to consider legislative history when 
construing an ambiguous statute but merely one of how to indicate that 
principle’s authority. Further, the court may cite other provisions of Iowa 
Code Chapter 4 even when it does not cite the Chapter for authority to use 
legislative history. In fact, this study found that in more than one-third of the 
cases in which the court uses Iowa legislative history without citing Iowa 
 
 332.  See IOWA CODE § 4.6(3) (2013). 
 333.  Moreover, one of these citations may have been made in error in that it is 
unclear why the court specifically mentioned Iowa Code Section 4.6; the context suggests 
the better reference would have been to all of Chapter 4. See State v. Fischer, 785 N.W.2d 
697, 702–03 (Iowa 2010) (“As directed by our legislature, the rules and definitions set 
out in section 4.6 do not apply if ‘inconsistent with the manifest intent of the general 
assembly, or repugnant to the context of the statute . . . .’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting IOWA CODE § 4.1 (2009)). 
 334.  In some cases, the court cited cases for the authority to utilize legislative history, 
and these underlying cases cited Iowa Code Section 4.6(3). See, e.g., Schadendorf v. 
Snap-On Tools Corp., 757 N.W.2d 330, 338 (Iowa 2008) (citing State v. Dohlman, 725 
N.W.2d 428, 431–32 (Iowa 2006)). 
 335.  See IOWA CONST. art. V, § 1 (granting the judicial power to a supreme court and 
other established courts). 
 336.  Gluck, supra note 44, at 1756 (“Every state legislature in the nation, in fact, has 
enacted into law some rules of interpretation, which many state courts are refusing to 
implement.”). Gluck documents Texas courts ignoring, and Delaware courts overruling 
as unconstitutional, interpretive statutes in their states because it is the courts’ place to 
interpret the law. Id. at 1825. On the other side, she notes how, in response to a 
Connecticut Supreme Court decision establishing an interpretive framework allowing 
the court to consult extrinsic sources even in the absence of statutory ambiguity, the 
Connecticut legislature enacted a law forbidding use of “extratextual evidence” unless 
the meaning expressed through its language and relation to other statutes is ambiguous 
or absurd. Id. at 1792 n.152 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-2z (2003)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). See generally id. at 1791–94. 
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Code Section 4.6(3) or Section 4.6 as a whole, other provisions of that 
Chapter were cited. Moreover, the Code history undercuts this possibility; 
given that Iowa has had some interpretive rules in its statutes since territorial 
times, much of the current iteration of Chapter 4 has been in place since 
1971, and when the 1971 provisions were adopted, the law represented a 
codification of the common law and had the approval of the former Chief 
Justice of the Iowa Supreme Court.337 
Why then does the court not regularly cite Iowa Code Section 4.6(3) 
when using legislative history to construe a statute? There might be times 
when the court eschews the codified rule in favor of presenting a more 
nuanced rule of interpretation established by case law. As Sutherland 
Statutory Construction notes, 
 Legislative enactment of the rules governing human affairs reduces 
the statement of the law to a more concise form than common or 
unwritten law. The advantages of brevity, however, sacrifice a 
legislature’s ability to provide specifically for numerous situations which 
might arise. In common law jurisdictions, this shortcoming is overcome 
by judicial constructions which modify and synchronize statute law with 
common law rules and maxims.338 
For instance, of the 21 cases that cite bill explanations,339 five opinions 
that cite neither Iowa Code Section 4.6(3) nor Section 4.6 as a whole provide 
common law support for the more specific proposition that the court looks 
to bill explanations for legislative intent,340 and another opinion supports the 
idea that the presumption that enactment of a statutory amendment is a 
change in the law can be overcome by legislative history that suggests it is 
merely a clarification.341 
In other cases, however, the court cites case law rather than Iowa Code 
 
 337.  See supra notes 101–3, 107–13 and accompanying text. 
 338.  2B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 331, § 50:2, at 156 (footnote omitted). 
 339.  See infra Appendix n.ii; supra Table 1 and accompanying text. 
 340.  See, e.g., Klinge v. Bentien, 725 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Iowa 2006) (“We give weight to 
explanations attached to bills as indications of legislative intent.” (quoting City of Cedar 
Rapids v. James Props., Inc., 701 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Iowa 2005)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 341.  See City of Asbury v. Iowa City Dev. Bd., 723 N.W.2d 188, 196 (Iowa 2006) 
(citing Martin v. Waterloo Cmty. Sch. Dist., 518 N.W.2d 381, 383 (Iowa 1994); Tiano v. 
Palmer, 621 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 2001); State v. Schuder, 578 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Iowa 
1998)). 
  
2015] Does the Past Predict the Future? 299 
 
Section 4.6(3), not to provide a more nuanced articulation of its rule, but 
simply to support the use of legislative history.342 In still other cases, it cites 
nothing to support its use of legislative history.343 It is possible that in some 
of these cases, the court merely thought it unnecessary to cite the Code in 
support of the well-established practice of citing legislative history.344 In 
certain instances, the omitted Code citation is more jarring than others. For 
instance, one 2013 decision cites Iowa Code Section 4.6(2) to support its use 
of “the circumstances of [the] statute’s enactment,” but rather than citing the 
subsequent Code subsection to support its “consider[ation of the] legislative 
history when interpreting an ambiguous statute,” it cites case law.345 
Consistently citing the appropriate Code provisions related to 
statutory interpretation offers two advantages. First, it brings attention to 
the rules codified in Chapter 4, a source that might sometimes be 
overlooked.346 Second, it improves research results using KeyCite or 
Shepard’s because a citator relies on direct citation of an authority for that 
authority to appear in its reports. Citing the relevant code section also 
increases the likelihood it will appear in the annotations to that Section in 
the Iowa Code Annotated. 
The uniformity of the code provision offers another advantage to citing 
the code provision instead of case law that says the same thing. Rather than 
uniquely wording the principle as opinions do, the statute uses the same 
words (until it is amended). This can help avoid subtle changes to a rule’s 
meaning as it is promulgated in different iterations. 
 
 342.  See, e.g., Postell v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 823 N.W.2d 35, 49 (Iowa 2012) 
(“The legislative history of a statute is also instructive in determining legislative intent.” 
(citing State v. Allen, 708 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Iowa 2006); Richards v. Iowa Dep’t of 
Revenue, 362 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Iowa 1985))). 
 343.  See, e.g., State v. DeSimone, 839 N.W.2d 660, 667 (Iowa 2013). 
 344.  In this way, it might be similar to the rule that no authority need be cited in 
support of the proposition that the court looks for legislative intent in what the 
legislature actually said rather than what it should or could have said. See supra notes 
49–50 and accompanying text. 
 345.  Schaefer v. Putnam, 841 N.W.2d 68, 75 (Iowa 2013) (discussing the general rule 
under Iowa Code Section 4.6(2) but citing State v. Romer, 832 N.W. 2d 169, 176 (Iowa 
2013) to support its use of legislative history). 
 346.  See State v. Velez, 829 N.W.2d 572, 586 (Iowa 2013) (Wiggins, J., dissenting) 
(noting the majority opinion failed to examine “a fundamental principle of statutory 
construction memorialized in the Code itself”). When the court does not cite Chapter 4, 
it is possible that it is simply overlooking that Chapter itself. 
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B. Clarify the Rule Regarding Use of Bill Explanations 
Whereas Section 4.6(3) simply authorizes the court to look at 
legislative history in construing an ambiguous statute,347 the common law 
expounds on this, using explanations as a valid source of legislative history 
and legislative intent.348 However, explanations have been noted as sources 
to which the court gives weight under two different circumstances. In this 
study, the rule was primarily expressed unconditionally,349 but in another 
articulation, the use of explanations was limited to times when there were no 
substantive amendments before the bill’s enactment.350 The same underlying 
authority has been cited for support for both propositions. 
That authority is City of Cedar Rapids v. James Properties, Inc.351 In 
this case, the court supported its use of an explanation without qualification, 
noting, “We give weight to explanations attached to bills as indications of 
legislative intent.”352 The Bill in question in the case was amended several 
times before its enactment, although none of these changes appear to have 
undercut the material quoted in the explanation.353 
In the current study, the court cited bill explanations in 21 opinions.354 
In only one of these, Root v. Toney, a 2013 opinion, did the court explicitly 
note the narrower rule for the use of explanations, stating, “There were no 
subsequent amendments before the bill’s enactment. Under these 
circumstances, ‘[w]e give weight to explanations attached to bills as 
 
 347.  IOWA CODE § 4.6(3) (2013). 
 348.  See Oyens Feed & Supply, Inc. v. Primebank, 808 N.W.2d 186, 188 (Iowa 2011) 
(citing a bill explanation and then noting that “[o]ther legislative history is sparse”); In 
re Det. of Fowler, 784 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Iowa 2010) (“As previously stated, we look to 
the legislative intent. We need not guess at the legislature's intent in enacting this chapter 
because an explanation is contained within the bill.” (citation omitted)). 
 349.  See Postell v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 823 N.W.2d 35, 49 (Iowa 2012) (citing 
City of Cedar Rapids v. James Props., Inc., 701 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Iowa 2005)). 
 350.  Root v. Toney, 841 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Iowa 2013) (quoting James Props., 701 
N.W.2d at 677). 
 351.  See James Props., 701 N.W.2d at 677 (citing State ex rel. Chwirka v. Audino, 260 
N.W.2d 279, 284–85 (Iowa 1977); City of Altoona v. Sandquist, 230 N.W.2d 507, 509 
(Iowa 1975)).  
 352.  Id. (citing Audino, 260 N.W.2d at 284–85; Sandquist, 230 N.W.2d at 509). 
 353.  See H. JOURNAL, 79th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. 1062, 1065–66 (Iowa 2001) 
(indicating amendments to H.F. 582, 79th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2001)); see 
also James Props., 701 N.W.2d at 677 (quoting Iowa H.F. 582, at Explanation). 
 354.  Supra Table 1. 
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indications of legislative intent.’”355 In four additional cases, the court 
discussed the amendment history of the bill along with the cited 
explanation.356 Among the other 16 cases, there are instances where the bill 
was amended without any explicit consideration in the court opinion as to 
whether these amendments might suggest a change in intent from what was 
expressed in the explanation. Some of these amendments were sweeping. 
For instance, Oyens Feed & Supply, Inc. v. Primebank cited a bill 
explanation with no discussion of the Bill’s amendment history.357 This Bill 
passed in the following session after it was essentially completely rewritten 
through amendments, with one adopted amendment “striking everything 
after the enacting clause” and offering new Bill text.358 The amendment itself 
was further amended three times before being adopted.359 Yet, even in that 
case, the broad language of the quoted portion of the explanation still seems 
relevant to the statute as enacted.360 
Just as it is often difficult to determine legislative intent at all, it can be 
problematic to determine whether the explanations clearly indicate intent. 
Despite some court opinions suggesting the explanation offers the words of 
the bill sponsor,361 it is drafted by the LSA. Although the LSA writes both 
 
 355.  Root, 841 N.W.2d at 88 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
James Props., 701 N.W.2d at 677).  
 356.  See Schaefer v. Putnam, 841 N.W.2d 68, 81 (Iowa 2013), as corrected (Dec. 18, 
2013) (noting “[t]here were no relevant amendments before the bill’s enactment”); State 
v. DeSimone, 839 N.W.2d 660, 667–68 (Iowa 2013) (noting that adopted amendments 
changed the validity of the bill explanation); Sallee v. Stewart, 827 N.W.2d 128, 141–42 
(Iowa 2013) (using the explanation to support the proposition that the legislation was 
based on a model act and continuing to note amendments to the Bill before its 
enactment); Postell v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 823 N.W.2d 35, 48–49 (Iowa 2012) 
(quoting a bill explanation before noting the Bill was replaced by another Bill using the 
same relevant language, then discussing some, but not all, of the amendments to the 
substitute Bill). 
 357.  See Oyens Feed & Supply, Inc. v. Primebank, 808 N.W.2d 186, 188 (Iowa 2011) 
(quoting S.F. 510, 70th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess., Explanation (Iowa 1984)). 
 358.  Amend. S-5122, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Iowa 1984); see S. JOURNAL, 70th 
Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. 434–35 (Iowa 1984) (noting the adoption of the amendment and 
the subsequent passage of the Bill).  
 359.  See S. JOURNAL, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. 434–35 (Iowa 1984).  
 360.  See id. at 1858–65 (displaying the text of the amendment); cf. Primebank, 808 
N.W.2d at 188 (quoting Iowa S.F. 510). 
 361.  See, e.g., Schadendorf v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 757 N.W.2d 330, 338 (Iowa 2008) 
(“In the explanation to the bill enacting section 86.13, the committee on labor and 
industrial relations of the senate stated . . . .”); State v. Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d 428, 432 
(Iowa 2006) (“First, in the explanation of the bill, the committee on the judiciary 
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the bill and its explanation, the legislature votes only on the bill, not on its 
explanation.362 The senate rule on explanations explicitly allows the sponsor 
to amend the explanation, while the house rule does not.363 In practice, 
however, amended explanations are rare. In fact, when the bill is amended 
by the chamber that introduced it, the version of the bill sent to the second 
chamber incorporates any adopted amendments and omits the 
explanation.364 (In these circumstances, the explanation would still be 
available to legislators through the bill book.) Therefore, even if a bill is 
substantively changed in such a way that the intent articulated in the 
explanation is also altered, it is highly unlikely that the explanation itself will 
also be changed. Consequently, it is clearly problematic to read and apply a 
bill explanation without considering that bill’s amendment history. It may 
even be reasonable to argue that explanations should only be used by the 
court when the bill was not amended before enactment. However, this 
approach may be excessively cautious, leaving the court to determine 
legislative intent with little alternative evidence beyond a statute that has 
already been deemed ambiguous. As an alternative, this Article 
recommends the court overtly analyze each explanation in light of the 
history of bill amendments, relying on an explanation only if it still seems to 
reflect intent accurately.365 This process would be similar to one the court 
routinely follows when determining whether case precedent still applies to 
an amended code section.366  
If the legislature felt that a more direct endorsement of the explanation 
would be beneficial, it could change its process to vote on the explanation, 
in addition to the bill. The drawbacks would expectedly outweigh any 
 
stated . . . .”). 
 362.  That distinction was first brought to this Author’s attention in 2002 by Doug 
Adkisson, who is now LSA Senior Legal Counsel. 
 363.  See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 364.  Email from Richard Johnson, Dir., Legal Servs. Div. of the LSA, to Author 
(June 23, 2014) (on file with Author). 
 365.  The court should also note the bill history to ensure it cites the appropriate 
explanation. In one instance, the court quoted an explanation to a bill that was not the 
version subsequently enacted. See In re Estate of Myers, 825 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2012) 
(quoting H.F. 677, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess., Explanation (Iowa 2009)). Although the 
court quoted House File 677, the version of the legislation that was eventually enacted 
came from the senate. See S.F. 365, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); see also B. 
History for Iowa S.F. 365, http://coolice.legis.iowa.gov/Cool-ICE/default.asp?Category= 
BillInfo&Service=DspHistory&var=SF&key=0399B&GA=83 (last visited Nov. 13, 
2014). Note, however, that the two explanations contained identical language. 
 366.  See supra notes 305–08 and accompanying text. 
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advantages of this approach, however. Not only would such a change likely 
significantly slow the legislative process, it would also probably change the 
nature of the explanations themselves. Bill explanations intend to provide a 
concise, objective statement of the manner in which the bill would change 
the law.367 Were the legislature to vote on them, explanations would almost 
assuredly assume a more partisan perspective in their final form. As a more 
modest change, the house could amend its rule on explanations and explicitly 
allow the option of amending an explanation in those rare cases when this 
would be deemed necessary. As a practical matter, however, the change 
might not be very meaningful; the Senate’s lack of use of this option suggests 
it is not a necessity. 
The legislature should certainly be aware of the court’s use of 
explanations, given that this is its most frequently cited source of legislative 
history, at least in the years considered in this study.368 It therefore seems 
reasonable to assume that legislators should already consider the use that 
the courts may make of the explanation when debating the bill and voting. 
To this extent, explanations are somewhat similar to fiscal notes,369 another 
source of legislative history that is not specifically endorsed via a vote but is 
available to inform both that vote and the interpretation of the enacted 
law.370 
However, a recent change to the presentation of explanations reflects 
the legislature’s desire that explanations be used cautiously. Beginning with 
2014 legislation, bill explanations now start with the following disclaimer: 
“The inclusion of this explanation does not constitute agreement with the 
explanation’s substance by the members of the general assembly.”371 This 
language was added by legislative leaders from both parties in consultation 
with the LSA, in part due to concern that the court was citing explanations 
of introduced bills without thoroughly considering the bills’ amendment 
 
 367.  See Johnson, supra note 134. Note that this has been true since at least the late 
1970’s; before this time, explanations may have been less objective, noting the merits of 
the proposal. Id.  
 368.  See supra Table 1. 
 369.  See id. 
 370.  Note, though, that fiscal notes indicate budgetary implications of the proposal. 
85th Gen. Assemb. J. Rules, supra note 32. In contrast, under current drafting guidelines, 
bill explanations include neither fiscal nor other consequences that would result from 
the change in law were the bill enacted as drafted. Email from Richard Johnson, Dir., 
Legal Servs. Div. of the LSA, to Author (June 23, 2014) (on file with Author). 
 371.  E.g., S.F. 2001, 85th Gen. Assemb., 2d. Sess., Explanation (Iowa 2014). 
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histories.372 
Given that all five cases in the study that both cite the bill explanation 
and discuss amendment history are from either 2012 or 2013 and that no 2013 
case cites a bill explanation without some discussion of the bill’s history of 
amendments, it is possible that the court is already in the process of refining 
the rule on its use of explanations in response to conversations with 
legislative leaders. If this is the case, it would not be apparent from the 
opinions alone, since the court did not explicitly indicate it is refining its rule 
but has continued to cite to some of the same cases to support its use of 
explanations. 
It will be interesting to observe how the court treats bill explanations 
in the coming years, especially when it first construes a statute enacted in or 
after 2014 that contains a disclaimer at the top of its explanation. The first 
opinion issued in 2014 in which the court cites a bill explanation does not 
clarify matters. In Star Equipment, Ltd. v. Iowa Department of 
Transportation, the court cited a 1988 bill explanation, indicating it was 
attached to “[t]he final version of the Senate File.”373 However, the Bill was 
amended after it was introduced,374 and the final senate version as it appears 
in the bill book did not include an explanation.375 The amendment itself does 
not seem to undermine the explanation.376 Even so, the amendment history 
was, at best, ignored and, at worst, misrepresented. To support its use of the 
bill explanation, the court quoted Root, which, in turn, quoted James 
Properties, but omitted the “[u]nder these circumstances” portion of the 
 
 372.  See Johnson, supra note 370. 
 373.  Star Equip., Ltd. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 843 N.W.2d 446, 454 (Iowa 2014) 
(discussing S.F. 2271, 72d Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Iowa 1988)). 
 374.  See S. JOURNAL, 72d Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. 857 (Iowa 1988). 
 375.  See B. Book for Iowa S.F. 2271, available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/she 
lves/billbooks/72GA/SF%202271.pdf (showing, in order: the introduced version of the 
Bill with the explanation at the end and amendment S-5271 taped to the first page, the 
version that passed the Senate with no explanation attached, the earlier iteration of the 
bill as S. Study B. (SSB) 2180 along with its explanation, and the enrolled version of the 
Senate File). 
 376.  In quoting the explanation, the court emphasizes the Bill is intended to extend 
certain remedies. Star Equip., 843 N.W.2d at 454 (quoting Iowa S.F. 2271). The 
amendment does not seem to negate the extension of these remedies but rather to 
specify how to seek them. See B. Book for Iowa S.F. 2271, available at https://www.legis. 
iowa.gov/docs/shelves/billbooks/72GA/SF%202271.pdf (showing the bill amendment 
that designated what type of action may result in remedies). 
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explanation rule.377 However, a footnote to the explanation rule introduces 
new details on the rule’s proper application: 
 The legislature enacts the bill—not the accompanying explanation. 
But, the internal rules governing the general assembly require the title 
and explanation to be accurate. An explanation or title included when a 
bill is introduced may become irrelevant when the text of the bill is 
materially changed by subsequent amendments. But, when the 
explanation accompanies the text of the bill enacted without a relevant 
substantive change, the explanation is part of the legislative history that 
can be examined in our efforts to determine the meaning of the text.378 
This expanded rule on the use of explanations does not indicate it is a 
change from the court’s earlier practice. If the court does not discuss bill 
amendment history when it cites a bill explanation, it will be difficult to 
ascertain whether the court considered that history and decided it did not 
result in a relevant substantive change or simply did not consider the history. 
A later 2014 case quotes, albeit only in a footnote, the explanation of a Bill 
that was enacted with no amendments379 as part of its discussion of the 
evolution of the relevant Code section.380 However, the opinion does not 
note the cited explanation accompanied a Bill that passed without 
amendment and provides no statutory construction rule supporting its use of 
the explanation or other Code section history.381 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There is not a precise formula that will alert someone reading the Code 
as to how the court will apply a particular statute to a specific set of facts, 
especially if the court is interpreting the statute for the first time. However, 
established interpretive aids can help either develop an educated guess as to 
a statute’s most likely interpretation or build a case that supports one 
reading over another. A sophisticated reading of a statute can be rather 
complex. Therefore, a careful reader will always examine a statute in 
context. This may well include considering its historical context. 
 
 377.  Compare Star Equip., 843 N.W.2d at 454 (Iowa 2014) (quoting Root v. Toney, 
841 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Iowa 2013)), with Root, 841 N.W.2d at 88. 
 378.  Star Equip., 843 N.W.2d at 454–55 n.3 (citations omitted). 
 379.  Shumate v. Drake Univ., 846 N.W.2d 503, 511 n.3 (Iowa 2014) (quoting S.F. 456, 
72d Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess., Explanation (Iowa 1988)); see B. Book for Iowa S.F. 456, 
available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/shelves/billbooks/72GA/SF%200456.pdf. 
 380.  See Shumate, 846 N.W.2d at 510 n.2, 512 n.5. 
 381.  See generally id. at 510–16. 
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As this study has shown, the Iowa Supreme Court can and does use 
historical sources, including legislative history, when interpreting ambiguous 
statutes. The court’s rates of citation to legislative history in this study—just 
more than 17 percent of identified statutory interpretation opinions citing 
either Iowa or model act legislative history and almost 11 percent citing Iowa 
legislative history—are sufficiently significant to encourage researchers to 
avoid overlooking these potentially relevant sources. Furthermore, a few 
hints exist that these rates could increase. The court is currently composed 
of the seven justices with the study’s highest rates of incorporating historical 
considerations in their statutory interpretation opinions. The court has also 
demonstrated an openness to considering a variety of historical sources, 
including floor debate, which is now available. 
The study denotes the specific sources of legislative history the court 
has used in the past. Although this may provide a good indication of what 
the court will use in the future, be aware that the court’s uses of extrinsic 
evidence may evolve in subtle ways, as appears to be occurring now with bill 
explanations. The court does not always clearly label refined interpretive 
rules as changes, making them easy to miss. This supports the argument that 
a court opinion that cites legislative history should cite Iowa Code Section 
4.6(3) among its authorities, also citing case law as necessary to provide a 
more nuanced application of the statutory principle. Such consistent citation 
of the Code provision would facilitate the compilation and comparison of 
these cases through the use of a citator or the Iowa Code Annotated, thus 
making it easier to understand the court’s practices with regard to legislative 
history. 
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APPENDIX 
 Table 1 
Source Number of Opinions Citing Sourcei 
Explanation 21ii 
Act text 12iii 
Bill amendment that passed 8iv 
Act summary 5v 
Fiscal note 4vi 
Prior bill/study bill 2vii 
Drafter’s comments or report 2viii 
Act title 1ix 
Bill amendment that failed 1x 
Bill title 1xi 
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 i.  The total of this column is greater than the total of unique opinions citing at 
least one Iowa legislative history source because some opinions cited more than one 
source. 
 ii.  Root v. Toney, 841 N.W.2d 83, 88, 89 (Iowa 2013) (quoting H.F. 113, 75th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Sess., Explanation (Iowa 1993)); Schaefer v. Putnam, 841 N.W.2d 68, 81 
(Iowa 2013) (quoting Iowa H.F. 2521, 78th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess., Explanation (Iowa 
2000)); State v. DeSimone, 839 N.W.2d 660, 667 (Iowa 2013) (quoting H.F. 674, 77th 
Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess., Explanation (Iowa 1997)); Sallee v. Stewart, 827 N.W.2d 128, 
141 (Iowa 2013) (citing H.F. 151, 62d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., Explanation (Iowa 
1967), at Explanation); In re Estate of Myers, 825 N.W.2d 1, 6, 7 (Iowa 2012) (quoting 
H.F. 677, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009)); id. at 4–5 n.5 (quoting H.F. 799, 81st 
Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess., Explanation (Iowa 2005)); id. at 6 n.6 (citing S.F. 365, 83d Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009), Explanation (appearing in Legis. Serv. Agency, 2009 
Summary of Legislation); Postell v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 823 N.W.2d 35, 48 (Iowa 
2012) (quoting H.F. 854, 81st Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess., Explanation (Iowa 2005)); Mueller 
v. Wellmark, Inc., 818 N.W.2d 244, 256 (Iowa 2012) (quoting H.F. 2307, 72d Gen. 
Assemb., 2d Sess. § 604, Explanation (Iowa 1988)); Oyens Feed & Supply, Inc. v. 
Primebank, 808 N.W.2d 186, 188 (Iowa 2011) (quoting S.F. 510, 70th Gen. Assemb., 1st 
Sess., Explanation (Iowa 1984)); id. at 189 (quoting S.F. 379, 80th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. 
Sess., Explanation (Iowa 2003)); Rolfe State Bank v. Gunderson, 794 N.W.2d 561, 566 
(Iowa 2011) (quoting H.F. 445, 78th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess., Explanation (Iowa 1999)); 
id. at 567–68 (quoting H.F. 2197, 78th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess., Explanation (Iowa 2000)); 
State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Iowa 2010) (citing H.F. 2546, 79th Gen. Assem., 
1st Sess., Explanation (Iowa 2001)); State v. Fischer, 785 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Iowa 2010) 
(citing H.F. 257, 57th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., Explanation (Iowa 1957)); Van Sloun v. 
Agans Bros., Inc., 778 N.W.2d 174, 183–84 (Iowa 2010) (quoting S.F. 289, 71st Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Sess., Explanation (Iowa 1985)); Griffen v. State, 767 N.W.2d 633, 635–36 
(Iowa 2009) (quoting S.F. 376, 63d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess., Explanation (Iowa 
1969)); Schadendorf v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 757 N.W.2d 330, 338 (Iowa 2008) (quoting 
S.F. 539, 69th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., Explanation (Iowa 1982)); City of Waterloo 
v. Bainbridge, 749 N.W.2d 245, 248 (Iowa 2008) (citing H.F. 2291, 80th Gen. Assemb., 
2d Reg. Sess., Explanation (Iowa 2004)); State v. Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d 428, 432 (Iowa 
2006) (quoting Iowa H.F. 674, at Explanation); Klinge v. Bentien, 725 N.W.2d 13, 18 
(Iowa 2006) (quoting Iowa H.F. 2521, at Explanation); City of Asbury v. Iowa City Dev. 
Bd., 723 N.W.2d 188, 196 (Iowa 2006) (quoting S.F. 78, 81st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess., 
Explanation (Iowa 2005)); Fjords N., Inc. v. Hahn, 710 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa 2006) 
(citing H.F. 115, 61st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1965)); Nixon v. State, 704 N.W.2d 
643, 648, 655 (Iowa 2005) (citing Iowa S.F. 376, at Explanation); City of Cedar Rapids v. 
James Props., Inc., 701 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Iowa 2005) (quoting H.F. 582, 79th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2001), at Explanation). 
 iii.  Schaefer, 841 N.W.2d at 76 (citing 1986 Iowa Acts, ch. 1214, §§ 18–19); id. at 76–
77 (quoting 1986 Iowa Acts, ch. 1214, § 1); id. at 79 (quoting 1990 Iowa Acts, ch. 1143, § 
1); Hook v. Trevino, 839 N.W.2d 434, 440 n.1 (Iowa 2013) (quoting 1987 Iowa Acts, ch. 
212, § 20); id. at 444 & n.4 (citing 1987 Iowa Acts ch. 212, §§ 2, 6–9, 11–13, 15, 19); Sierra 
Club Iowa Chapter v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 832 N.W.2d 636, 643, 645 (Iowa 2013) 
(quoting 1974 Iowa Acts, ch. 1090, § 9); id. at 643 (citing 2008 Iowa Acts, ch. 1032 § 
201(2); 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1202, §13); In re Estate of Whalen, 827 N.W.2d 184, 188, 190, 
191 (Iowa 2013), reh’g denied (Mar. 8, 2013) (citing 2008 Iowa Acts, ch. 1051, §§ 1–3, 17–
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21, 22); Sallee, 827 N.W.2d at 141–42 (quoting 1967 Iowa Acts, ch. 149, § 2; 1971 Iowa 
Acts, chs. 129–30; 1988 Iowa Acts, ch. 1216, § 48; 2012 Iowa Acts, ch. 1100, § 58); State 
v. Jones, 817 N.W.2d 11, 16 (Iowa 2012) (quoting 1976 Iowa Acts, ch. 1245(2), § 1301; 
1977 Iowa Acts, ch. 153, § 44); Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 808 N.W.2d 
417, 420–23, 428 (Iowa 2011) (citing and quoting several acts to trace Code history and 
noting multiple changes derived from a single piece of legislation); In re Det. of Johnson, 
805 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Iowa 2011) (citing 2002 Iowa Acts, ch. 1139, §§ 1–27); Gunderson, 
794 N.W.2d at 566, 568 (citing 1999 Iowa Acts, ch. 162, § 1; 2000 Iowa Acts, ch. 1211, §§ 
1–3); id. at 567–68 (quoting 2000 Iowa Acts ch. 1211, § 3); Drake Univ. v. Davis, 769 
N.W.2d 176, 185 (Iowa 2009) (quoting 2004 Iowa Acts, ch. 1001, § 20); State v. Tesch, 
704 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Iowa 2005) (quoting 1986 Iowa Acts, ch. 1178, § 1); Schlote v. 
Dawson, 676 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Iowa 2004) (quoting 1975 Iowa Acts, ch. 239, § 1). 
 iv.  State v. DeSimone, 839 N.W.2d 660, 667–68 (Iowa 2013) (citing amendments to 
Iowa H.F. 674); Iowa Dental Ass’n v. Iowa Ins. Div., 831 N.W.2d 138, 146 n.3 (Iowa 
2013) (quoting S. Amendment 5185, 83rd Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Iowa 2010)); H. 
Amend. 8490, 83d Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Iowa 2010)) (citing S. Amend. 5233, 83d Gen. 
Assemb., 2d Sess. (Iowa 2010)) (discussing amendments to H.F. 2229, 83d Gen. Assemb., 
2d Sess. (Iowa 2010)); In re Estate of Whalen, 827 N.W.2d at 190–92 (discussing 
amendments to S.F. 473, 82d Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Iowa 2008)); Sallee, 827 N.W.2d at 
141 (discussing amendments to Iowa H.F. 151); Tooker, 808 N.W.2d at 430 (discussing 
changes to S. Study B. 3210, 83d Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess., § 1; S.F. 2354, 83d Gen. 
Assemb., 2d Sess. § 1 (Iowa 2010)); In re Marshall, 805 N.W.2d 145, 156 (Iowa 2011) 
(discussing amendments to S.F. 85, 66th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Iowa 1976)); Wright v. 
Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 747 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Iowa 2008) (discussing amendments to S.F. 
2197, 79th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2002)); State v. Allen, 708 N.W.2d 361, 
367 (Iowa 2006) (discussing amendments to S.F. 101, 78th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess., 
Fiscal Note (Iowa 1999)). 
 v.  Iowa Dental Ass’n, 831 N.W.2d at 140, 149 (quoting 2010 Iowa Acts ch. 1179); 
State v. Velez, 829 N.W.2d 572, 580 (Iowa 2013) (quoting 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245(1), § 
804); Gunderson, 794 N.W.2d at 568 (quoting 2000 Iowa Acts ch. 1211); Renda v. Iowa 
Civil Rights Comm’n, 784 N.W.2d 8, 19 (Iowa 2010) (quoting 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 121); 
State v. Lathrop, 781 N.W.2d 288, 295 (Iowa 2010) (quoting 2005 Iowa Acts ch. 158). 
 vi.  Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 789 N.W.2d 417, 421 (Iowa 
2010) (citing H.F. 126, 77th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess., Fiscal Note (Iowa 1997)); State v. 
Fischer, 785 N.W.2d 697, 702 (Iowa 2010) (citing H.F. 2205, 78th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess., 
Fiscal Note (Iowa 2000)); State v. Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d 428, 432 (Iowa 2006) (quoting 
Iowa H.F. 674, at Fiscal Note); State v. Allen, 708 N.W.2d 361, 367 (Iowa 2006) (citing 
Iowa S.F. 101, at Fiscal Note; Amend. S–3071 to Iowa S.F. 101, at Fiscal Note). 
 vii.  Tooker, 808 N.W.2d at 430 (citing S. Study B. 3210, 83d Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. 
§ 1 (Iowa 2010) and first version of Iowa S.F. 2354); Dalarna Farms v. Access Energy 
Coop., 792 N.W.2d 656, 660 n.3 (Iowa 2010) (citing H. Study B. 278, 80th Gen. Assemb., 
2d Sess. § 1 (Iowa 2004)). 
 viii.  In re Estate of Sampson, 838 N.W.2d 663, 667, 670 (Iowa 2013) (quoting IOWA 
CODE ANN. §§ 488 bar comm. cmt., at 140, 489 bar comm. cmt., at 141 (West Supp. 
1963)); Sierra Club Iowa Chapter, 832 N.W.2d at 647 (quoting ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, 
AMENDMENTS TO IOWA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, REPORT ON SELECTED 
PROVISIONS TO IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION AND IOWA STATE GOVERNMENT 36–37, 
39–40 (1998)) (citing BONFIELD, supra, at 1–8) (discussing the comments to Section 
17A.9 from the task force that drafted the recommendations). 
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 ix.  Lathrop, 781 N.W.2d at 295 (quoting 2005 Iowa Acts ch. 158). 
 x.  See Iowa Dental Ass’n, 831 N.W.2d at 146–47 n.3 (citing the history of 
amendments that both passed and failed for Iowa House File 2229). 
 xi.  Sallee v. Stewart, 827 N.W.2d 128, 141 (Iowa 2013) (citing H.F. 151, 62d Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess., Explanation (Iowa 1967)). 
